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Abstract
Mobile location data are ubiquitous in the digital world.

People intentionally and

unintentionally generate numerous location data when connecting to cellular networks or
sharing posts on social networks. As mobile devices normally choose to communicate with
nearby cell towers outdoor, it is reasonable to infer human locations based on cell tower
coordinates. Many social networking platforms, such as Twitter, allow users to geo-tag their
posts optionally, publishing personal locations to friends or everyone. These location data are
particularly useful for understanding mobile usage behaviors and human mobility patterns.
Meanwhile, the public expresses great concern about the privacy and security of their location
information. Secure sharing of locations and mitigating malicious location queries from bots
(especially on mobile devices) become increasingly imperative and necessary.
For mobile location analytics, we first study the cellular traffic data generated during
the communication between mobile apps and nearby cell towers. We propose a multi-level
mixture of kernel density estimation (mlKDE) model to profile the geospatial distribution
of given individual apps, and demonstrate that mlKDE could effectively and robustly
characterize the distributions of app usage in the real world. Then we investigate the
location information shared publicly by social media users. Several Twitter case studies
are conducted to illustrate how social location data inferred human mobility as well as
geospatial distribution patterns.
To enhance the security of private locations, we propose homomorphic bloom filters to
enable one party to determine, in a private and secure manner, whether or not the trajectory
of a second party has an intersection with specific locations of interest. As location-based
services are mainly operated on mobile devices, location queries are frequently launched by
mobile users. To distinguish humans and bots, we design and implement SenCAPTCHA, a
v

mobile-first CAPTCHA using orientation sensors. SenCAPTCHA works by showing users an
animal image and asking them to tilt their devices to guide a red ball into the center of that
animal’s eye. Two usability studies show that SenCAPTCHA is an “enjoyable” CAPTCHA
and it is preferred by the majority of participants to other existing CAPTCHA systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, smart mobile devices have become an integral part of people’s daily lives.
According to Statista [26], global smartphone users in 2020 reached 3.5 billion, which makes
44.87% of the world’s population a smartphone owner. The ubiquitous mobile devices
generate huge amounts of diverse data every day. Among them, the mobile location is one of
the most important and unique data types because it records sensitive personal information
and is easy to be produced in various scenarios. For example, when smartphones connect
cellular networks, nearby cell towers can locate mobile users approximately. Many social
networking platforms, such as Twitter, allow users to publish geo-tagged contents to the
public. These location data play a key role in the understanding app usages, tracking
human mobility, and discovering insightful geographic patterns. Meanwhile, privacy and
security of location data have raised significant concern, especially after the FacebookCambridge Analytica data scandal [122] in 2018. It becomes imperative to tackle the paradox
between security and usability of location data. As most location-based services are designed
for mobile devices, mobile malicious bots may aggressively attack remote location servers.
Therefore, mobile-friendly authentication solutions to distinguish between humans and bots
are desired and needed.

1

1.1

Spatial Mobile APP Usage in Cellular Networks

Mobile apps are reshaping the way humans communicate in everyday life. For example,
more and more people are sending and receiving messages through instant messaging apps
(e.g., WhatsApp) or social networking apps (e.g., Twitter), rather than through Short
Message Services (SMS, also known as “text messages”) for their personal communications.
In particular, it was reported in 2014 that the data traffic generated by traditional voice
calls accounts for less than 10% of all mobile data traffic [31]. Such changes coincided
with the large and rapidly growing number of smartphone users, who more and more
frequently use data-intensive services. Recent advances in technology and developments
in infrastructure [31] have played major role in enabling those data-intensive services. In
order to meet the data traffic demands, mobile network operators are constantly upgrading
network capacities. App usage data with geospatial information can inform the actions that
mobile network operators take in a number of critical operational decisions. Therefore, the
abundance of mobile apps’ data, which account for a large proportion of base stations’ traffic
load, is ripe for exploration and analysis.
Existing studies focused on understanding the geospatial data generated by mobile
apps from various perspectives. Many studies explored the geospatial information to track
human mobility [68, 111], ignoring the data volumes. Collecting data from instrumented
smartphones operated by very limited number of volunteers (30 volunteers for [68] and
5 volunteers for [111], in particular), these studies could not provide the geographical
distribution of various apps on a large scale. Other studies identified diverse usage behaviors
of smartphone apps and showed the geospatial distribution of aggregated app usages in
same genres (e.g., social networking, game, email) on a large scale [88, 100, 123], but did not
demonstrate the geospatial distribution of individual app usage. Antithetically, we assume
the perspective of service providers (i.e., app developers and mobile network operators)
to focus on the geospatial characteristics of individual apps, with all users considered in
aggregate. The question we attempt to address is that, given records of app usages, can
we profile the geospatial distribution of data volumes caused by the usage of each app in
a robust manner? This question is essential for solving a number of real-world resource

2

scheduling and optimization problems, such as bandwidth allocation, load balancing, and
network caching.
Despite the exciting possibilities, profiling the distribution of data volumes per app is a
challenging problem. First, different apps exhibit a high degree of heterogeneity in functions
and characteristics. For example, navigation apps are mainly used on highways or local
roads; flashlight apps become active after nightfall; and instant messaging apps are typically
used continuously. Second, the profiles have to be dynamically updated over time. The same
app has different geospatial distributions at different times. This could be caused by many
factors, such as fluctuations in the number of app users, movements of app users, usages of
app’s provided functions. Third, the mobile data traffic of an individual app can be quite
sparse during short intervals, especially for a large number of less popular apps on the long
tail. We can only obtain inaccurate geospatial distribution patterns by applying existing
sparse models on an individual app’s data traffic.
To address these challenges, we propose a multi-level mixture model based on kernel
densities, where each level is represented by a single kernel density estimation. In particular,
we consider the data volumes of mobile apps at three different granularity levels. At the
individual app level, we consider the total data volumes generated by all people who are
using the app. At the group level, we aggregate data volumes from a group of related apps
to represent certain properties of the app (e.g., based on category or purposes). At the
population level, we aggregate the data volumes from all apps, which represent the overall
activeness of all users. After estimating the spatial density of data volumes at each level, we
adaptively train the kernel weights, which not only profile the geospatial distribution of an
app more robustly, but also provide interpretable insights about the app and its peers, at
multiple levels. Finally, the three kernel estimations are combined together, based on their
respective weights, to build the multi-level mixture model.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows. First, we provide a multi-granularity
solution of mobile apps’ data, by considering individual level, group level, and population
level data volumes, to overcome the sparsity of individual level data and build a multi-level
mixture model based on kernel densities with a high fitting accuracy. Second, our model
can handle the heterogeneity of different apps as well as the dynamic profiling for the same
3

app over time. For both different apps and the same app at different time points, our model
adaptively assigns weights for the three levels of data. The weights can also be used to
analyze the uniqueness of apps. Third, our model is general enough to be applied to other
domains with similar formats.

1.2

Publicly Shared Location Data on Social Networks

In the past decade, social networks have emerged and grown into one of the most important
communication tools to broadcast oneself, build connections with friends, and express
opinions and emotions to the public. Many social networking platforms, e.g., Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat, allow users to optionally geo-tag their posts on social
media. Such location information bridges the online and offline worlds by linking virtual
contents and activities with real places.
Among all popular social networks, Twitter stands out as an open data source for
numerous location-based research studies due to its following features.

First, Twitter

ranks as one of the most active social media, generating 500 million tweets per day [107].
Second, Twitter users expect what they post, including physical locations, to be publicly
available, addressing potential ethical concerns of collecting user data. Third, multiple types
of locations, namely user profile locations and tweet locations, are available on Twitter.
Profile locations consist of free-form text, and tweet locations can be either general places or
GPS coordinates. Finally, Twitter provides APIs for randomly sampling tweets of interest,
whereas many other social network platforms prohibit automated content scrapers (e.g.,
Facebook [32] and Instagram [54]).
Twitter location data inspire and motivate a large number of research works in various
fields, such as disaster tracking [57, 4], public health monitoring [28, 121], human mobility
analytics [48, 58], and even presidential election predictions [101, 55]. Researchers utilized
Twitter as a crowdsourcing platform to harvest tweets across regions of interest. Since
geo-tagged tweets recorded where, when, and what the public did, they were crucial for
discovering knowledge and revealing insightful patterns.
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In this dissertation, we collect and analyze large amounts of Twitter streaming location
data to study human mobility, service petitions, transportation, and disease propagations.
We demonstrate Twitter locations are social-good but may leak sensitive information, such as
home addresses. Our studies examine how big geo-tagged data on social networks facilitate
large-scale and complex social computing research in multiple scenarios. Specifically, we
chase the 2017 Great American Eclipse on Twitter to look into human mobility during oncein-a-lifetime events. We also present the petition patterns of new emojis on Twitter inside
the United States and across the world. Then, we take Twitter as our lens to show the
geographic usage patterns of shared electric dockless scooters in English-speaking countries.
Finally, we create a large geo-tagged COVID-19 Twitter dataset to track residents’ reactions
and point out the potential private information leakage.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows. First, we overcome the challenges of
collecting, preprocessing, and analyzing streaming big social media data to advance the
research of social physics [5]. In each case study, millions of real-time tweets are harvested
for in-depth analytics. Second, heterogeneous location data, including countries, states,
counties, and GPS coordinates, are considered to extract underlying patterns. For example,
we innovatively infer local time zones, which was disabled by Twitter APIs in May 2018,
from state locations to profile temporal distributions at the hour level. The GPS-tagged data
enable us to reveal the possible private location leakage, such as home addresses. Third, all
of our case studies keep up with recent or current events and provide timely feedback and
insights for understanding these events.

1.3

Online Secure Sharing of Private Locations

Location data are becoming increasingly popular on social networks and mobile apps.
Smartphone users are sharing location data, ranging from ride-sharing apps to geographically
enhanced games, such as the Pokemon Go, among others. In these scenarios, one big concern
is the privacy of users, as unexpected leaks of users’ location trajectories will allow potentially
malicious attacks to gain advantages in the real world [30]. For example, by knowing when
a user leaves and returns home each day, a potential third-party attacker could identify the
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time periods during which the user’s home is not occupied. The attacks range from mild
inconveniences such as privacy leaks to much more serious attacks such as break-ins.
One significant challenge in keeping location data secure is that we should not trust
servers as safe against attacks [64]. Indeed, the significant increase on hacking activities
against servers means that if we store non-encrypted data on servers, we will face the risks
of data leakage when the servers are compromised. Perhaps paradoxically, when building
apps that involve location data, servers typically perform extensive computation on the
location traces, making it necessary for the servers to be able to decrypt data as needed. For
example, Facebook servers need users’ non-encrypted locations to find nearby friends. Mobile
service providers need users’ rough locations to analyze smartphone usage behaviors [77].
Consequently, we ask, is it possible for us to maintain the security of location traces while
allowing servers to perform location-specific computations, such as calculating intersections?
Given the demands to keep user location data secure, as well as the need for the servers
to perform basic operations on the trajectory data, in this dissertation, we develop a
secure computation framework on location data where the servers have no knowledge of
its original data, i.e., the servers do not keep the private keys to decrypt data. In this
way, compromised servers will not cause leaked user data. Our work is motivated and
enabled by the recently developed fully homomorphic encryptions, where recent progress
demonstrated it is feasible to perform meaningful and predictable computations on encrypted
data without decrypting them first [37, 33]. Although existing primitives primarily support
simple operations such as bit-wise operators, additions, and multiplications, in this work,
we build on these homomorphic techniques, and expand them to support location-specific
calculations.

Specifically, we focus on one commonly used building-block operation in

location based data processing: computing the location intersections.
Formally, this computational operation assumes that two users, Alice and Bob, want
to find out if their location datasets (e.g., collections of singleton locations, or trajectories,
or areas within specified boundaries) have intersections. The application model works as
follows: Alice first publishes her location datasets that are encrypted using her public key,
via the cloud aggregation server, so that Bob does not get access to the plain data directly.
Instead, Bob can build a query based on his location sets and send it to the aggregation
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server. Note that as Bob also cares about his privacy, his query is also encrypted by Alice’s
public key. To increase security, before being encrypted, both Alice’s location dataset and
Bob’s query are inserted into an advanced data structure called the bloom filter [8], which
hashes all location data into binary strings. In this way, even when the cloud aggregation
server is compromised and the secret key of Alice is hacked at the same time, the plain
location data is still not leaked. Next, the aggregation server performs the matching step,
where Alice’s encrypted datasets are matched against Bob’s query, and a (still encrypted)
computational result is returned to Alice. Alice can decide whether there is an intersection
between the incoming query and her datasets by decrypting the result using her own private
key. If there is an intersection, Alice is probably able to send additional information to Bob.
We now make a few remarks on this computational model.

First, by design, this

model ensures that the location datasets are fully secure, as Alice will only publish the
hashed datasets after encryption. On the side of Bob, the query location data is also preprocessed using hash functions, and then encrypted using Alice’s public key. Hence, Alice
and Bob never need to share the plaintext of their location trajectories directly. Second, this
computational model is particularly secure against compromised servers, as the aggregation
server does not keep any plaintext of location trajectories. Finally, only queries that return
positive results (i.e., there are intersections) will lead to further interactions between Alice
and Bob. For queries that do not return intersections, Alice and Bob do not learn about
each other’s locations.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we design and propose a fully
homomorphic version of the bloom filter. Second, we develop multiple optimized protocols
that allow one party to determine, in a private and secure manner, whether or not a second
party’s trajectory has an intersection with the first party. Our design is fully flexible,
meaning that each user is able to specify what kind of datasets (e.g., trajectories, areas,
and isolated points) they would like to make visible, and be queried by other users. Third,
we offer working prototypes based on the open-source homomorphic libraries. Additionally,
our preliminary evaluation results on a real-world dataset, which is collected in a city area
on users’ smartphones, demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approaches as well as the
security of the protocol designs.
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1.4

Blocking Malicious Bot Attacks on Locations

Bots (autonomous Internet programs and scripts) are an important piece of the Internet. For
example, Googlebot crawls the Internet to gather data necessary to power Google’s search
engine. However, over 55% of bot traffic is malicious, with 94.2% of websites experiencing
at least one bot attack every 90-days [53]. These malicious bots are responsible for a range
of undesirable actions, such as comment spamming, password guessing attacks, and click
fraud. Therefore, differentiating between human- and bot-initiated actions is a critical task
on today’s Internet.
To fight against malicious bots, von Ahn et al. [78] proposed the Completely Automated
Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) system in 2000.
AltaVista [73] implemented one of the first practical CAPTCHA schemes and used it to block
fraudulent account registrations. Today, there are many different CAPTCHA systems, with
most systems being able to be categorized into text-based, image-based, audio-based, videobased, and puzzle-based CAPTCHAs. While recent updates to Google’s ReCAPTCHA
system (i.e., NoCAPTCHA) can reduce the frequency with which users need to solve a
CAPTCHA, they do not remove the need for CAPTCHAs altogether. As such, research is
still needed to increase the effectiveness and usability of CAPTCHA systems.
Most existing CAPTCHAs are designed for desktop users, failing to offer user-friendly
mechanisms to mobile users who frequently generate and query personal information
including location data. It is problematic to run these CAPTCHAs on mobile devices for a
couple of reasons. First, many CAPTCHAs are not designed to work well when screen size
or resolution is limited. While mobile phone screen sizes and resolutions continue to increase
in size, this is not true of wearable technology (e.g., smartwatches). For example, the 44mm
Apple Watch has a screen size of just 9.77 cm2 and a resolution of only 368 by 448 pixels.
Second, CAPTCHAs designed for desktops fail to take advantage of the sensors available
on modern mobile devices. This is unfortunate, as leveraging the phone’s sensors could help
compensate for the limited screen size and resolution.
In this dissertation, we present SenCAPTCHA, an orientation sensor-based CAPTCHA
scheme that addresses both these limitations. SenCAPTCHA works by displaying a picture
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of an animal and asking users to tilt their phones to guide a red ball into the center of
that animal’s eye. Using the trajectory of the ball, SenCAPTCHA can distinguish between
human- and bot-generated solutions. SenCAPTCHA requires very little space to display
and complete the CAPTCHA, allowing it to work well on mobile and wearable devices with
small screens (e.g., smartwatches). Additionally, using the orientation sensor avoids the need
for users to type text or select images, tasks which can be difficult on smaller screens (e.g.,
awkward keyboards, fat finger problems).
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows. The design of SenCAPTCHA,
a mobile-first CAPTCHA that uses a mobile device’s orientation sensor to compensate
for limited screen space. We demonstrate that by rotating and tiling the animal image
shown to users by SenCAPTCHA, we can prevent machine learning algorithms from
locating the animal’s eye (i.e., identifying the solution to the puzzle). By examining the
trajectory used to solve SenCAPTCHA, we can also differentiate between bots that are
searching for the animal’s eye and users who know where it is, helping prevent bot-based
attacks against SenCAPTCHA. We conduct a usability study of SenCAPTCHA with 270
participants. The results of this study identify how various features—how the image is
modified, the starting point for the red ball, and how close the ball needs get to the eye—
affect completion time and perceived usability. We conduct a usability study with 202
participants comparing SenCAPTCHA to four other representative CAPTCHA schemes
demonstrating that SenCAPTCHA outperforms these systems regarding perceived usability
and completion time. Most participants indicated that SenCAPTCHA was their favorite
CAPTCHA of those tested.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter, we summarize recent literature on the location-inspired studies in the context
of cellular networks and social networks, and solutions for secure sharing locations and
combating location bots.

2.1

Spatial Modeling of Mobile App Usages

Many spatial models [34, 72, 100, 123, 128, 129], which can profile the spatial distribution
of app usages, have been explored in the existing literature. Fu et al. [34] explored the
geographic dependencies of estate values from various granularities and exploited these
dependencies in a probabilistic ranking model. Zheng et al. [128] developed a predictive
model to forecast the air quality monitored by weather stations. The proposed data-driven
model considers local temporal factors, global spatial factors, meteorological data and sudden
changes. Both Fu et al. [34] and Zheng et al. [128] also used large-scale information to aid
in fine granularity prediction. Studies like [100, 123] characterized geospatial dynamics of
aggregated app usages, but they did not demonstrate the geospatial distribution of individual
app usage. Zhou et al. [129] proposed a predictive method using spatial-temporal kernel
density estimation (stKDE) to deal with complex spatio-temporal dynamics and sparsity
at high resolutions in large-scale datasets. A spatio-temporal weight function was adopted
based on informativeness to the current predictive task to incorporate temporal and spatial
patterns in ambulance demand.
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Lichman et al. [72] developed accurate individual-level models of spatial location based
on kernel density estimates (KDE). Spatial distribution modeling at the individual level
is a challenging problem due to the sparsity of data and heterogeneity of mobility patterns
among individuals. Although direct application at the individual level may cause a significant
over-fitting problem, such problems can be eliminated with a hierarchical extension of the
traditional KDE. The hierarchical KDE has inspired us to develop our model incorporating
the data traffic at the scale of the group level and the population level to deal with the
sparsity problem for a single app. However, the characteristics of our data and our approach
are different with [72] in the following aspects. First, the data samples of [72] were randomly
distributed in a large region, while our data samples were specific cell tower locations with
dynamic data volumes. Second, Lichman et al. [72] assigned each individual component
the same weight, while the individual components in our approach are assigned dynamically
varying weights based on their features at different given time.

2.2

Geo-tagged Social Media Data Analytics

There is rich literature investigating how locations shared on social networks facilitate diverse
research studies. We mainly focus those works from four categories, namely, human mobility,
online campaigns, transport studies, and disease propagations. For human mobility, Hawelka
et al. [48] explored international travel patterns using almost one billion geo-located tweets
and concluded that Twitter was a useful proxy for understanding and quantifying global
mobility patterns.

Similarly, Jurdak et al. [58] demonstrated geo-tagged tweets could

capture rich features of human mobility including the diversity of movements within and
between cities. For social network based campaigns, Harlow et al. [47] reported that social
networks played an important role in contemporary activism in both the United States and
Latin America. Borge-Holthoefer et al. [10] revealed the structural and dynamical patterns
emerging from the activity of Twitter around the May 15th movement in Spain.
Many existing works leverage geo-tagged social media data to study transport related
research questions. Grant-Muller et al. [43] summarized how to use social media sources,
including location names, to enhance transport data collection. Maghrebi et al. [79] extracted
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travel modes from Twitter data posted in Melbourne metropolitan areas.

There also

exists a considerable body of literature examining how location-based social media can help
understand and monitor disease propagations. For example, Tran et al. [114] utilized a
large-scale analysis of geo-tagged social media messages to understand the public reactions
towards Ebola. Qazi et al. [90] released the GeoCoV19 dataset, which contained hundreds
of millions of multilingual geo-tagged tweets, to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.
Inspired by these existing works, we further explore the locations posted on social
networks in the context of recent and emerging events, including 2017 Great American
Eclipse, online emoji campaigns, emerging shared dockless e-scooters, and COVID-19. In
each case study, we collect millions of streaming tweets and conduct timely and in-depth big
data analytics. Besides, diverse locations extracted from user profiles and what people post
on social media have been studied.

2.3

Secure Sharing of Private Locations

Previous work on keeping location secure has investigated multiple directions. The first
direction, which is called k-anonymous obfuscation [18], tries to hide the true locations
of users by obfuscating them to the granularity of larger cells. Such methods, though
privacy-aware, make it harder to develop applications that require precise user locations.
Another method is through statistical methods [99], which add random noise to the samples
of individual users, but keep the global statistical parameters to be more or less reliable.
Such methods are only suitable for large-scale statistical needs, but are not useful where one
user’s data needs to be exploited for application needs, e.g., ride sharing and navigation.
Our proposed approaches fall under the third direction that performs encryption and
decryption methods on the location data in order to achieve location security and privacy
even when servers may be compromised. One recently developed encryption scheme suitable
for this purpose is the homomorphic encryption, which aims to support complex processing
on the encrypted data without decrypting them first, yet still yielding results that, once
decrypted, are meaningful and correct. The homomorphic encryption has widely inspired
applications [75, 69] of cloud computing.
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Existing work in this direction has attempted to apply homomorphic computing
techniques to process location data.

For example, the work in [46] utilized partially

homomorphic encryption to develop a privacy-preserving location proximity protocol called
the InnerCircle. A more recent work [7] adopted homomorphic encryption to determine an
optimal meeting location for a group of users. Note that all of these works are implemented
based on partially homomorphic encryption methods that only support limited types of
operations, i.e., either addition or multiplication, but not both.
A common task needed in location data processing is related to checking intersections
between private sets. To this end, previous work has taken advantage of a data structure
called the bloom filter, which supports constant time checkings on set memberships. For
example, the work in [27] proposed the garbled bloom filters, based on which the oblivious
Bloom intersection is performed to check the private set intersections. Another work [127]
used the bloom filters to represent the location tags to conduct private proximity tests.
In [60], the bloom filter was combined with partially homomorphic (Goldwasser−Micali)
encryption to design an outsourced private set intersection protocol. Because partially
homomorphic encryption only supports either the multiplication operation or addition
operation, the work [60] had to rely on additional methods, such as the Sander Young
Yung technique [97], to mimic the second operation but with a failure probability.
In contrast to these existing efforts, our work is directly motivated by the recent
progress to develop fully homomorphic encryption schemes, such as the well-known scheme
developed by Gentry in 2009 [37]. Compared with partially homomorphic encryption, this
scheme is far more powerful because it supports both multiplication and addition operations
simultaneously and allows for arbitrary computations on the encrypted data principally [2].
Inspired by Gentry’s work [37], several practically feasible fully homomorphic encryption
schemes have been developed [33, 117, 12]. Therefore, we build our protocol on top of
existing fully homomorphic computing libraries, but we note that future developments of
better paradigms will lead to lower computing cost and overhead, as well as better security
in our system.
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2.4

Authentication Solutions to Battle Location Bots

The CAPTCHA is one of the most widely used authentication mechanisms to defend against
malicious bot attacks. Many different categories of CAPTCHA schemes have been proposed
in the literature. In this section, we discuss several of these approaches.
Google’s NoCAPTCHA: Recently, Google updated its reCAPTCHA v2/v3 (i.e.,
NoCAPTCHA) [51] to identify bots by examining information regarding the user’s network
connection, browser settings, cookies, and previous browsing behavior. In many cases,
NoCAPTCHA can completely avoid user interaction or only ask the user to click a checkbox
that says, “I’m not a robot.” Still, there are many instances in which NoCAPTCHA
is unable to automatically determine whether a user is human. This can be because of
technical limitations (e.g., cookies are deleted, an incognito web browser session is used, or
JavaScript is disabled [104]) or because NoCAPTCHA’s algorithm lacks sufficient evidence
to confirm whether the user is human. In these cases, NoCAPTCHA falls back to showing
users a traditional CAPTCHA. As such, NoCAPTCHA does not remove the need for other
CAPTCHAs, but rather only reduces how often CAPTCHAs must be shown.
Text-Based CAPTCHAs: Text-based CAPTCHAs take advantage of the inherent
difficulty of Optical Character Recognition (OCR). The first practical text-based CAPTCHA
was invented by Altavista [73] in 1997. Later, von Ahn et al. [120] proposed reCAPTCHA,
a system that asked users to transcribes text scanned from old books.

There is also

research that seeks to make it more difficult to perform OCR. Baird et al. [3] proposed
the ScatterType CAPTCHA, which resisted the segmentation of characters from a word.
Hsieh et al. [50] adopted the scale-invariant feature transform (SIFT) algorithm to make
characters indiscernible for bots but distinguishable for humans. In recent years, text-based
CAPTCHAs have been shown to be vulnerable to deep learning-based approaches [41, 17,
105]. The future of text-based CAPTCHA seems uncertain [103], with companies like Google
gradually phasing out text-based CAPTCHAs.
Audio-Based CAPTCHAs: To make CAPTCHAs available for individuals with visual
impairments, a range of research explored audio-based CAPTCHAs [49, 62, 19, 35, 66],
which rely on the difficulty of transcribing the text, particularly when there is significant
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background noise [22]. However, audio-based CAPTCHAs are limited in that they require
different datasets for each spoken language and also that in many languages have multiple
letters that are difficult to distinguish aurally [108].
Video-Based CAPTCHAs: In 2009, Kluever et al. [61] proposed the first video-based
CAPTCHA, where users watch a video and select the correct labels associated with the video.
The first widely deployed video-based CAPTCHA was released by NuCaptcha [52] in 2010.
Different from Kluever et al.’s work [61], NuCaptcha provides a video of codewords moving
across a dynamic scene. Later research [124, 16] defeated the security of NuCaptcha by
adopting moving-image object recognition (MIOR) techniques. Still, compared to static
text- and image-based CAPTCHAs, video-based CAPTCHAs are believed to provide a
higher level of security [108]. On the other hand, loading large files may adversely affect
user experiences, especially for mobile users where bandwidth is limited.
Image-Based CAPTCHAs: Bongo, developed by Mikhail M. Bongard [9], is one of the
earliest visual pattern recognition problems used as CAPTCHAs [119]. Chew et al. [21] were
among the first to study labeled photograph-based CAPTCHAs. Since then, many image
recognition-based works have been proposed, such as IMAGINATION [25] and Asirra [29].
Gossweiler et al. [42] proposed CAPTCHAs by requiring users to identify an image’s upright
orientation. Matthews et al. [80] proposed a scene tagging test, which relies on the ability
of users to recognize the relationships between irregularly shaped objects embedded in a
background image. However, many studies [108, 40] have identified disadvantages with
image-based CAPTCHAs.
Puzzle-Based CAPTCHAs:

Gao et al. [36] proposed the jigsaw puzzle-based

CAPTCHA by dividing an image into misplaced pieces. Kaur et al. [59] designed a boolean
algebra puzzle-based CAPTCHA using circuit diagrams consisting of basic logic gates like
OR, AND, NOR, among others. Conti et al. [23] implemented the CAPTCHAStar system
based on interactive shape discoveries. These CAPTCHAs share in common that they
mostly rely on conventional puzzle designs and require additional efforts to pass these puzzles
compared to the image-based or text-based ones.
CAPTCHAs Designed for Mobile Devices:

Researchers have also proposed

some CAPTCHA systems for mobile users to protect their sensitive data The Drawing
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CAPTCHA [102], one of the first CAPTCHAs designed for mobile devices, required users
to draw appropriate lines on a screen to solve the CAPTCHA challenge. Lin et al. [74]
proposed CAPTCHA Zoo by projecting 3D natural animals into 2D models with a natural
background. In addition, several motion sensor based CAPTCHAs have been developed,
such as accCAPTCHA [71], GISCHA [126], and CAPPCHA [45]. However, these systems
did not demonstrate the involved hard problems could resist computer vision based attacks.
Our proposed SenCAPTCHA also leverages built-in motion sensors on mobile devices, and
designs a flexible game-like image-based puzzle for users to solve. More importantly, we
conduct machine learning and deep learning attack experiments to demonstrate its security.
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Chapter 3
A Multi-Granularity Perspective for
Spatial Profiling of Mobile Apps
In this chapter, we leverage cell tower locations to investigate the geospatial distribution of
individual mobile apps on cellular networks. For apps with sparse data, it is challenging to
estimate their geospatial distribution robustly. Instead of only focusing on the app itself data,
we take a multi-granularity view on the data generated by all apps and apps in corresponding
groups. We propose a multi-level mixture of kernel density estimation (mlKDE) model, which
assigns optimal weights for each granularity level, to smooth the spatial profiling. Note that
this chapter is based on my published paper:
Y. Feng, Z. Lu, W. Zhou, Q. Cao and X. Li. A Multi-Granularity Perspective for Spatial
Profiling of Mobile Apps. Information Sciences 430, (2018): 127-141.

3.1

Problem Formulation and Data Description

In this section, we first formulate the research problem and discuss a general scenario where
our model could be applied. Then we describe the spatial feature of cell towers in our dataset.
Finally, we provide a descriptive study of the app categories used in our model.
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3.1.1

Problem Formulation

In this study, we focus on the geospatial distribution of data volumes due to mobile app
usages. As the cell towers provide services to nearby users, it is possible to measure various
activities through these towers, such as data volumes downloaded by individual apps, and
estimate the overall distribution of such measures over the region. Formally, given records
that can be written as
hTowerID, TimeStamp, AppID, Volumesi,

(3.1)

We are interested in finding the density distribution of download volumes attributable to
each given app over the region. The objective is to identify estimates that are smooth,
efficient, robust, and interpretable.
It is straight-forward to slice time into preferred level of granularity, such as per minute,
or per hour. When slicing time into refined, short intervals, the pass-through data volumes
will be so low that density estimates at the app level will become unstable. It is hard to
summarize the distribution smoothly when the data change abruptly. One possible source
of information we could leverage is the hierarchy of app categories. Information at the
population level (i.e., all apps) may indicate the overall activeness of users at that time of
day. Information at the group level (i.e., all apps in the corresponding category) may indicate
the users’ interest.
Investigating geospatial distribution of apps’ data is important for several reasons. First,
understanding geospatial distribution of apps’ data can provide valuable insights on the need
to increase network capacity based on data traffic demands. Monitoring and analyzing apps’
geospatial distribution can assist mobile network operators in improving their customers’
user experiences, such as upgrading network hardware and software, and deploying new
equipment like portable base stations. Second, the geospatial distribution of apps’ cellular
data at a large scale provides valuable information about users’ smartphone usage behaviors
collectively, which can be utilized by advertisers [113], location-based service providers [70],
social scientists [1] and even tourists [84]. Cellular data based descriptive statistics like which
apps are most popular in specific regions, what best app choices will match users’ preferences
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at different locations, will offer fundamental information for future investigations. Third,
modeling geospatial distribution of an individual app is valuable for the further development,
promotions, and maintenance of the app itself. At the design stage, analyzing and comparing
the geospatial distributions of the competitive apps can help developers discern the relation
between these apps’ geospatial distributions and their specific functions. When promoting
the app, our model allows users to obtain the geospatial distribution of the app, which
can be used for ad placement to maximize promotional effects. During the operations and
maintenance phase, data traffic demands for different regions can be calculated aggregately,
and app local-based service caches can be added where app services are heavily requested to
reduce the response time.
Note that our proposed methodology may be expanded to other general scenarios. The
given observations can be written as
hSensorID, TimeStamp, EventID, EventValuei.

(3.2)

Our goal is to model the geospatial distribution of the measurements for each event, collected
by a number of fixed sensors whose locations are known. The location is usually denoted
as a longitude-latitude pair in geographical coordinates, and the TimeStamp is the date and
time when an event occurs. The EventValue is a quantity that represents the measurement
of interest for the event.
Since the goal is to profile the geospatial distribution, it is necessary to ascertain the
density of the event measurement for any given longitude-latitude pair. Since the sensors
are deployed with varying densities over the region of interest, it is critical to craft a concise
description of such densities to support efficient understandings and decision-making.
A possible example scenario of utilizing our model is analyzing the sales data from
multiple stores or sales outlets where the sales of each product may be aggregated at
the brand level or product type level. Like Equation 3.1, the data may be written as
hStoreID, TimeStamp, UPC, Quantityi. Our methodology can be utilized to profile the sales
volumes of any given product, and compare that information to products from the same
category, and the overall sales across a region with many stores.
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3.1.2

Cell Tower Location

Figure 3.1(a) displays the distribution of cell towers all over a city to ensure service coverage.
The distribution of cell towers is dense in the downtown area, while relatively sparse on the
outskirts of the city. At each tower, various measurements can be made that probe into the
distributional density of the quantity of interest. In Figure 3.1, we visualized measurements
of each tower using red circles. The radiuses of circles represent the quantity of interest, such
as the number of unique users in Figure 3.1(b), and the total data volumes in Figure 3.1(c)
and Figure 3.1(d). We can see that the downtown area is densely populated, where each
cell tower serves a large number of users, but not all towers possessing large total data
volumes are located in the downtown area. We can also observe that the data volumes are
not proportional at each tower to the number of unique users served. In particular, towers
serving a small number of users might also process a large amount of total data volumes.
Figure 3.1(c) and Figure 3.1(d) demonstrate that data volumes vary greatly over time, even
though cell towers remain fixed.

3.1.3

Apps Information

Millions of mobile apps are available on the app market [106], and each generates a large
amount of download and upload data traffic through nearby cell towers. We expect that
different apps have different data requirements in term of data rates, availability, etc, so
examining the apps and their categories enhances modeling the data requirement for each
app. For example, based on our data, the 50 most popular apps are shown in Figure 3.2,
which indicates a long-tail distribution. In this figure, we can see that social software apps,
such as instant messaging, social networking, web surfing, browsing and daily life services
tools, are very popular. Moreover, navigation, map, and traffic apps are also frequently used.
Note that since our data is collected from the 2G network (the dominating technology in the
areas we study), if a user switches to Wi-Fi, we cannot observe the data. As a result, more
data intensive apps (like video streaming) are under-represented, since users often switch to
Wi-Fi for extended use of these apps in order to save data costs. Meanwhile, navigation
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(a) Tower Locations

(b) Number of Unique Users (6:00 pm - 7:00 pm)

(c) Total Data Volumes (6:00 pm - 7:00 pm)

(d) Total Data Volumes (7:00 pm - 8:00 pm)

Figure 3.1: Geographic distribution of cell towers, unique users and total data volumes.
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apps are often used in areas without good Wi-Fi coverage, and thus users have to rely on
the 2G network regardless of data demands.
As suggested in Figure 3.2, some apps have high data volumes due to their popularity,
but there are many others that were less popular with sporadic observations. For apps with
a small amount of data, it is very challenging to estimate their distributions in a robust way.
Thus, we are motivated to pursue a high data stability by aggregating related apps. This
aggregation may happen among apps that share similar properties or functionalities, and
be done at a suitable granularity level. In our dataset, we grouped apps into a three-level
tree-like hierarchy, wherein each app only belongs to a single top category, as illustrated
in Figure 3.3(a). However, our framework is general enough to easily extend to multiple
categories, as illustrated in Figure 3.3(b).

3.2

Modeling Individual Apps’ Spatial Distributions

Based on cell towers’ latitude and longitude, we modeled the data traffic distribution with
probabilistic density functions over this two-dimensional space. To ensure a more flexible
model that will adapt to the topology of this two-dimensional space, we shall use mixture
models. It is well understood that Gaussian-based kernel density models are usually more
flexible and accurate than the Gaussian model and the Gaussian mixture model. In [72],
the authors argued that neither the Gaussian model nor the Gaussian mixture model can be
used to accurately characterize sparse geospatial distributed data. Therefore, based on these
findings, we use the kernel density model rather than the Gaussian model or the Gaussian
mixture model.

3.2.1

Kernel Density Estimation

During the time window t, the data volumes downloaded by one app from tower i is denoted
(t)

as voli . In this subsection, since we focus on spatial models, we ignore the time period
identifier t on the superscript.

The location of tower i is denoted as (lati , loni )T and

our observations are collected as (lati , loni , voli )T , where i is a subscript that goes over
each tower (i=1,2,. . . , n) and the superscript T means transpose. Given all data points
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Figure 3.2: Top 50 apps by total data volumes.
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P = {~p1 , p~2 , . . . , p~n }, where p~i = (lati , loni , voli )T is the observation from tower i, and a
bandwidth h, then the Gaussian kernel density estimation (KDE) can be written as


n
1
1 X
T
−1
fKDE (~x | P, h) =
voli exp − (~x − ~xi ) Σh (~x − ~xi ) ,
2nπh i=1
2

where Σh = 

h 0

(3.3)


 and ~xi = (lati , loni )T .

0 h
Lichman et al. [72] proposed to adaptively learn the bandwidth H = {h1 , h2 , . . . , hn }

for different event points (GPS-located Twitter tweets and Gowalla checkins). Given such
an event point is denoted as ~xi = (lati , loni )T , the Gaussian kernel density function can be
written as



n
1
1 X 1
T
−1
gKDE (~x|P, H) =
exp − (~x − ~xi ) Σhi (~x − ~xi ) ,
2nπ i=1 hi
2


where Σhi = 

hi

0

(3.4)


 and P = {~x1 , ~x2 , . . . , ~xn }. In our case, an adaptive bandwidth

0 hi
for our events is not necessary.

Unlike the events in [72], our events (i.e.

bytes of

data downloaded through cell towers) occurred exclusively at the locations of cell towers.
Therefore, every byte of the data is associated with a nearby cell tower at a known and fixed
position. Based on our observations, the spatial density differences of towers at downtown
areas and on outskirts are not distinct enough to assign an individual bandwidth for each
tower.

3.2.2

The Multi-level Mixture of Kernel Density Estimation

With non-negative mixing weights π = {π1 , π2 , . . . , πG } such that

PG

g=1

πg = 1, the multi-

level mixture of kernel density estimation (mlKDE) can be written as

fmlKDE (~x|V, H, π) =

G
X

πg fKDE (~x|Pg , hg ),

(3.5)

g=1

where G is the number of components, V = {P1 , P2 , . . . , PG }, Pg stands for all data points
from component g, and H = {h1 , h2 , . . . , hG }, hg is the bandwidth of component g. In our
case, since all data points of different components are collected from the same towers, the
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bandwidths of all the components should be the same. So, Equation 3.5 can be written as

fmlKDE (~x|V, h, π) =

G
X

πg fKDE (~x|Pg , h).

(3.6)

g=1

3.2.3

Algorithm Implementation

To overcome the sparsity of data at the individual level, the mlKDE with the Gaussian kernels
was used to describe the data traffic density distribution of an individual app. The basic idea
of the mlKDE is first applying Gaussian KDE on multi-granularity data, then combining
all these KDEs with corresponding and reasonable weights, and finally determining the
target density distribution.

Figure 3.4 illustrates how the mlKDE is used to estimate

the data traffic density distribution of app i at time window of t in City B’s downtown
area. Three Gaussian KDE components, population component, group component and
individual component, are combined together with respective weights to build the mlKDE.
Each component is a Gaussian KDE over the 2-D (latitude, longitude) geographical space,
expressed as Equation 3.3. The population component aggregates total data volumes of all
apps at time window t; the group component aggregates total volumes of all the apps in
the same group to which app i belongs at time window t; the individual component only
captures the data volumes of app i at the time window of t − 1.
Next, we must train the mixing weights πg in Equation 3.6 which are crucial to the
accuracy of mlKDE. In our case, three components were considered, i.e. G = 3, so
P
π = {π1 , π2 , π3 } and 3g=1 πg = 1. We took Pt (the population data at time window t),
Gt (the group data at time window t) and It−1 (individual data at time window t − 1)
as the training set, and It (the individual data at time window t) as the validation set.
For each observation (lati , loni , voli )T in the validation set It , we calculated its probability
density under each component using the training set. Then, we optimized the combinations
of π = {π1 , π2 , π3 } by maximizing the joint likelihood for all observations in It . Because
the observation (lati , loni , voli )T was equivalent to sampling (lati , loni )T for voli times from
tower i, it could be regarded as a weighted observation (lati , loni )T with a weight of voli .
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Figure 3.4: mlKDE to combine multi-granularity data.

Based on the weighted observations, we used an EM algorithm to train mixing weights for
mlKDE, as shown in Algorithm 33.
Lines 1-6 initialize the mixing weights π1 = π2 = π3 = 1/3 and use Equation 3.3 to
calculate the likelihood Lij of the weighted observation (lati , loni )T of Tower i for component
j. Lines 7-33 train the mixing weights of mlKDE until they converge. Lines 8-23 is the
0
expectation (E) step, which first computes P rij
the probability that the weighted observation
0
00
(lati , loni )T of tower i comes from the component j, then normalizes P rij
as P rij
, and finally

calculates P rij by considering the weight voli of each weighted observation (lati , loni )T .
Lines 24-32 is the maximization (M) step. Since the KDE is nonparametric given that the
bandwidth h is fixed, no parameter needs to be updated for mlKDE except for the mixing
weights:

Pn
vol · P rij
Pn i
πj = i=1
i=1 voli

(3.7)

where n is the total number of cell towers.
In this algorithm, the likelihood Lij of the weighted observation (lati , loni )T of Tower i
for component j is computed only once, greatly decreasing the computing time.
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Algorithm 1: The EM Algorithm for the Training Mixing Weights of mlKDE
input
: Pt : population data at time window t; Gt : group data at time window
t; It−1 : individual data at time window t − 1; It : individual data at
time window t; Ti : weighted observation (lati , loni )T of tower i; Let
V = {Pt , Gt , It−1 }, i.e., V1 = Pt , V2 = Gt , V3 = It−1
output
: π = {π1 , π2 , π3 }: non-negative mixing weights, i.e. weights of
population component, group component and individual component,
subject to π1 + π2 + π3 = 1
1 foreach component j do
2
πj ← 1/3;
3
foreach Tower i do
4
Lij ← fKDE (Ti | Vj , h);
5
end
6 end
7 while π not converge do
// E step
8
foreach Tower i do
9
sum pro ← 0;
10
foreach component j do
0
← Lij ∗ πj ;
11
P rij
0
12
sum pro ← sum pro + P rij
;
13
end
14
foreach component j do
00
0
15
P rij
← P rij
/sum pro;
16
end
17
end
18
foreach Tower i do
19
voli ←volumes of Tower i from It ;
20
foreach component j do
00
21
P rij ← P rij
∗ voli ;
22
end
23
end
// M step
24
foreach component j do
25
sum pro ← 0;
26
sum vol ← 0;
27
foreach Tower i do
28
sum pro ← sum pro + P rij ;
29
sum vol ← sum vol + voli ;
30
end
31
πj ← sum pro/sum vol;
32
end
33 end
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3.3

Experimental Results

In this section, we report experimental results based on real-world datasets. We provide
an overview of the dataset, present the experimental setup, and discuss the insights and
performance evaluation results.

3.3.1

Datasets and Experimental Setup

Our datasets consisted of more than 22 million records generated by mobile apps via 2G cell
towers in 10 mid-sized cities in the same province of China. Each record included the tower
ID, the app ID, data volumes, and the starting and ending time stamps. Generally, mobile
network operators rely on the Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technique, which can identify,
filter and analyze data packets, to acquire the app ID from mobile data traffic [6, 24]. All
data were collected from 6:00 pm to 9:00 pm on a Sunday evening in September 2014. The
total download data volumes of all apps was over 220 GB and the number of unique users is
401,272. Table 3.1 shows summary statistics of the 10 cities.
All experiments were performed on a PC with a 3.30GHz Core i5 processor and 8GB
memory, running Windows 7 Enterprise. The KDE and mlKDE were implemented in
MATLAB R2014b. For mlKDE, we have tried various bandwidth values (0.01, 0.1 and
1) and time window sizes (1 minute, 3 minutes and 5 minutes). Due to space limitation, we
set the bandwidth default as 1 and the time window size default as 1 minute in the rest of
the experiments unless otherwise specified.

3.3.2

What Does mlKDE Visualization Look Like?

QQ is one of the ubiquitous instant messaging tools in China, which was developed by Tencent
and has over 1 billion registered users worldwide. According to Tencent’s Q3 report in
2015 [110], the number of monthly active users of QQ on smart devices was 639 million. In
this section, we use QQ as an example to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in
profiling the spatial distribution of QQ’s data volumes in a timely fashion.
Example density distributions of QQ and the corresponding group and population are
provided in Figure 3.5, which were estimated using Gaussian kernel density functions.
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Table 3.1: Detailed overview information of the 10 cities.
City
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J

Area (km2 )
1,915
1,446
1,439
928
1,160
656
1,349
2,855
1,461
2,395

Population
1,200k
1,166k
1,108k
793k
804k
666k
1,286k
966k
614k
1,572k

# Towers
118
122
178
264
262
498
127
175
62
206
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# Users
27,837
31,816
39,242
39,849
41,809
100,844
30,227
34,352
17,232
38,064

# Records
1,291,537
2,040,977
2,087,500
2,238,362
2,144,647
5,937,397
1,894,636
1,733,018
768,526
2,285,537

Volumes (GB)
11.78
20.71
19.01
23.35
21.82
61.73
19.41
16.74
7.71
23.36
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Figure 3.5: Actual density distributions of QQ at different granularity levels in city F .
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The individual level density distribution at the 49th and 50th time window is shown in
Figure 3.5(a) and Figure 3.5(b), respectively. Despite QQ being a very popular app that has
large data volumes, it is evident that at the individual app level, the density distribution
of consecutive time windows differ greatly. This indicates that if we focus on data at the
individual level, the noise and variations will be large, which may make it hard to recognize
the geospatial distribution patterns. In contrast, when observing at the group and population
level, the densities for the same time windows exhibit much greater stability (see Figure 3.5(c)
to Figure 3.5(f)).
Based on data presented in Figure 3.5, Figure 3.6 demonstrates the individual level spatial
density estimates using different approaches. Figure 3.6(a) and Figure 3.6(b) show the actual
density distributions at the 49th and the 50th time window. The two figures depict density
distributions flexibly, but they change dramatically from the 49th to the 50th time window.
Figure 3.6(c) and Figure 3.6(d) describe the 2D Gaussian density distribution of individual
level data at 49th and 50th time window respectively. Both of Figure 3.6(c) and Figure 3.6(d)
have only one dense center, which implies they are too coarse and not flexible enough to
describe the actual density distributions, even though the shapes of density distributions
remain relatively stable as time changes. Compared with our proposed mlKDE, both the
above 2D Gaussian and KDE do not take into account the group data and population data,
Figure 3.6(e) and Figure 3.6(f) illustrate the density distributions using mlKDE. The mlKDE
density distribution reveals two dense centers located at similar positions where the dense
center found in KDE was located, which means they were able to depict density distributions
in a flexible way. Additionally, the mlKDE density distributions remain relatively stable
with advancing time, which estimates and profiles the geospatial distributions of individual
apps in a robust manner. Furthermore, it demonstrates an easily recognizable pattern,
regardless of whether the actual individual level distribution is too sparse or sporadic. This
pattern provides valuable knowledge that mobile operators and app developers can employ
to optimize bandwidth allocation, load balancing, and network caching.
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Figure 3.6: Density estimates of QQ in city F using different approaches.
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3.3.3

How to Interpret Mixing Weights?

In this subsection, we examine the mixing weights trained by our model, focusing on the
interpretations and implications. First, we show that the same app’s mixing weights are
consistent across different cities. Second, we present the relative stability of the mixing
weights of apps over time. Third, we provide examples of applying mixing weights to test
the uniqueness of distinct apps.
Are Mixing Weights of Same Apps Similar in Different Cities?
We trained the mixing weights of myriad apps in 10 cities, and discovered that the mixing
weight patterns of the same app in all these cities were very similar. For example, the
average mixing weights of two apps, WeChat and Momo, are listed in Table 3.2. For WeChat,
both the population and individual weights were quite low (both below 0.1) whereas the
group weights were high (above 0.8). For Momo, the group weights were low (below 0.1)
whereas the population and individual weights were higher (both between 0.3 and 0.7). The
overall distributional pattern of mixing weights of the same app varied only slightly across the
different cities, indicating that our approach did find results that are repeatable in different
geographical areas.

Table 3.2: Mixing weights of WeChat and Momo in 10 cities.
City
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
Avg.
S.D.

Population
0.008
0.004
0.005
0.005
0.001
0.001
0.010
0.005
0.025
0.007
0.007
0.007

WeChat
Group
0.941
0.922
0.951
0.942
0.979
0.970
0.919
0.939
0.890
0.925
0.938
0.026

Individual
0.051
0.074
0.044
0.053
0.020
0.029
0.071
0.056
0.085
0.068
0.055
0.020
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Population
0.433
0.373
0.417
0.375
0.417
0.362
0.378
0.377
0.363
0.378
0.387
0.025

Momo
Group
0.026
0.024
0.018
0.020
0.019
0.014
0.031
0.013
0.032
0.014
0.021
0.007

Individual
0.541
0.603
0.565
0.604
0.564
0.624
0.591
0.610
0.605
0.608
0.592
0.026

Are Mixing Weights Stable Over Time?
Apps in the same group have certain common characteristics, but can also possess their
own independent features. We picked two instant messaging apps, WeChat and Momo, to
demonstrate and analyze their different mixing weights. Table 3.2 shows the difference in
average mixing weights between these two apps.
The dynamic mixing weights of WeChat and Momo from 6:00 pm to 9:00 pm in city B
are shown in Figure 3.7. We can easily see differences in their mixing weights. WeChat
has a heavy group weight dominating the weights of both population and individual, which
perhaps can be explained by the fact that WeChat is the most popular instant messaging
app and its data volumes account for more than 64.6% of the total instant messaging data
volumes in our data. Due to its market dominance, the WeChat usage behaviors can represent
all instant messaging apps to a certain degree. However, for Momo, the individual weight is
largest followed by weights of population and group components. Unlike WeChat and most
other instant messaging apps connecting familiar people, Momo is uniquely aimed at matching
people for chats and dates. It is Momo’s uniqueness that produced the close to zero weights
of the group component.
How Do Mixing Weights Identify Uniqueness of Apps?
Generally, there are strong discriminations between the weights of different apps. What
if app A was used to estimate the data volume density distribution at each granularity
level (using KDE) and train the weights among these levels using app B’s data (i.e., by
calculating the likelihood of observing app B’s data given app A’s density distributions)?
Intuitively, the weight of the individual component would normally be very low, because it
was designed to capture the unique app-level characteristics. However, the weights of the
group and population components depend on the similarity of the apps’ groups. If app A
and app B belong to different groups, the weight of the group component would be low
(due to low group similarity) and the weight of the population component would be high.
An example is shown in Figure 3.8(a), where the Appstore data were used to estimate the
distributions at each level and the WeChat data were used to train the weights. On the

34

1

1

population
group
individual

0.6

population
group
individual

0.8

Weight

Weight

0.8

0.4
0.2

0.6
0.4
0.2

0

0
20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

20

40

60

Minute

80

100

120

140

160

180

Minute

(a) WeChat

(b) Momo

Figure 3.7: Mixing weights from 6:00 pm to 9:00 pm in city B.
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contrary, if app A and app B belong to the same group, the weight of the group component
would be high and the weight of the population component would be low. An example is
shown in Figure 3.8(b), where the QQMusic data were used to estimate the distributions at
each level and the KugouMusic data were used to train the weights. This finding can attest
to the veracity of our mlKDE approach.
Using the mlKDE method, we can analyze the uniqueness of apps, which is important
information when developers make policies when designing and developing apps. In general,
one app will be more similar with apps in the same group than with apps classified in different
groups. However, in some cases, the temporal and spatial density distributions of some apps
will be much different from other apps in the same group. We call these apps “singular”
apps. One example of a singular app is SkyMap, cataloged in the group of “maps.” SkyMap
is unique in that its users typically access the app at night when they are located outdoors.
Other map apps, such as GoogleMap and Navfree, are heavily used both during the daytime
and the nighttime.

3.3.4

How Much Does mlKDE Perform Better than KDE?

We compared the performances of the KDE and the mlKDE quantitatively. Intuitively,
mlKDE is more robust and flexible than KDE, because mlKDE leverages aggregate
information from group and population data, which enables it to better handle apps with
sparse individual data. We evaluated the performances of the KDE and the mlKDE in the
10 cities with different parameters. Figure 3.9 shows the average log likelihood of KDE and
the mlKDE. We found that average log likelihood over all apps of mlKDE outperforms KDE
in nearly all cities with different bandwidths. With the decrease of bandwidths from 1 to
0.01, the performances of mlKDE are slightly enhanced while that of KDE are weakened
dramatically. This demonstrated the robustness of our approach and unstableness of KDE
in terms of bandwidth.
For mlKDE, a smaller bandwidth leads to a higher accuracy, because a small enough
bandwidth will treat each cell tower located at fixed positions as distinct peak, which is
consistent with the characteristics of our data. For KDE, we used the data of previous
time window to estimate the distribution, and the data of current time window to calculate
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Figure 3.9: Average log likelihood over all apps.
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City J

average log likelihood. Since the data density distributions of an app may vary greatly
between two continuous time windows, a smaller bandwidth depicting the previous time
window data with a higher accuracy would not guarantee a good description of current time
window data (see Figure 3.6(a) and Figure 3.6(b)). Therefore, the average log likelihood
would be very low when the bandwidth is set as a small value. As the bandwidth becomes
larger, the KDE describes the data of previous time window more coarsely, but it is a better
fit for the data of current time window, so the average log likelihood rises.
The experimental results presented in this subsection are based on the time granularity
of 1 minute (i.e. the time window length is 1 minute). Consistent results were found for
different time granularity of 3 minutes, 5 minutes and 10 minutes.

3.3.5

Are Mixing Weights Sensitive to Bandwidths?

The mixing weights of different components greatly impact the performance evaluations of
mlKDE. In our experiments, we tested different values of bandwidths and found that the
smaller the bandwidth, the better the performance. However, when the bandwidth becomes
small enough, the mixing weights of mlKDE are minimally sensitive to different bandwidths.
Figure 3.10 shows the weights of individual, group and population component of WeChat in
City B, using bandwidths 0.01, 0.1 and 1 respectively. Data with bandwidths of 0.01 and
0.1 have almost identical weights for all components. The weights of data with a bandwidth
of 1 is slightly different with the other two values at several time points, but all three values
have the same trend. We also tested other apps and found the same result. We can conclude
that mixing weights is not sensitive to bandwidths when bandwidths are adequately small.
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Chapter 4
Investigating Shared Locations On
Social Networks
In this chapter, we take Twitter as a lens to investigate the publicly shared locations on social
networks. We first introduce Twitter location types and the methodologies to infer locations
given free-text descriptions. Then we use four case studies to demonstrate how Twitter
location data facilitate the research of human mobility, online petitions, transportation, and
disease propagations. Note that this chapter is partially based on my published papers:
Y. Feng, Z. Lu, Z. Zheng, P. Sun, W. Zhou, R. Huang, and Q. Cao. Chasing Total Solar
Eclipses on Twitter: Big Social Data Analytics in Once-in-a-lifetime Events. IEEE Global
Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2019
Y. Feng, W. Zhou, Z. Lu, Z. Wang, and Q. Cao. The World Wants Mangoes and
Kangaroos: A Study of New Emoji Requests Based on Thirty Million Tweets. The Web
Conference (formerly known as WWW), 2019.
Y. Feng, Z. Lu, W. Zhou, Z. Wang, and Q. Cao. New Emoji Requests from Twitter
Users: When, Where, Why, and What We Can Do About Them. ACM Transactions on
Social Computing (TSC) 3(2), 2020.
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4.1
4.1.1

Twitter Location Types
Twitter User Profile Location

The profile location refers to the residential address where Twitter users specified in their
public account profiles. Since Twitter users are allowed to use free-form text to describe
profile locations, it is challenging to extract precise geographical information from such
messy, flexible and diverse profile locations using rule-based approaches. Instead, we resort
to Nominatim [87], a search engine for OpenStreetMap data, to infer the most likely locations
by submitting queries via Nominatim online APIs. Places at different levels of detail (e.g.,
city, county, and street) are fetched through Nominatim depending on the address precision
in the user profile. For example, the exact latitude/longitude point coordinate of a coffee
house titled “Precision Pours” at Louisville, Colorado can be determined by querying the
detailed location of “1030 E South Boulder Rd”. Note that some account locations, such as
“17th & Fontain”, “Anywhere, Earth”, and “From old houses, to old towns”, are too casual
to be geo-referenced.

4.1.2

Tweet Location

When posting tweets, Twitter users are allowed to geo-tag their tweets, publishing their realtime locations. Tweet locations can be either a box polygon of coordinates defining general
areas like cities and neighborhoods, or an exact GPS latitude and longitude coordinate. Both
types of tweet locations contain high-level geography information, such as the associated
country and state, making it possible to explore the overview of national and statewide
geographic patterns. The geo-tagged states can also infer local time zones that had been
removed from public tweets since May 2018, enabling the investigation of local hourly
tweeting behaviors.
As tweet GPS locations identify exact coordinates, they contain more detailed location
information such as the associated county. Similar to parsing user profile locations, we
leverage Nominatim [87] to retrieve the corresponding detailed places, e.g., the county and
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street, for GPS data. Then GPS locations are aggregated together based on the extracted
places to discover fine-grained geographic patterns.

4.2

Human Mobility During the 2017 Great American
Eclipse

4.2.1

Background and Tweet Collection

A natural phenomenon of The 2017 Great American Eclipse happened on Aug 21, 2017 (see
Figure 4.1) offered a perfect chance to study how the extremely rare event influenced the
people’s life in large scale. This coast-to-coast total solar eclipse crossed the continental
United States (U.S.) for the first time since 1918, and the next one with a similar path will
occur in 2024. This rare and spectacular event attracted wide attention from the entire
continent. According to The Washington Post [44], nine in ten adults in the U.S. watched
this total eclipse. In addition, the eclipse related topics went viral on social networks before,
during, and after this event.
To chase this total solar eclipse on social networks, we used Twitter’s Streaming APIs,
which enable developers to filter and collect real-time tweets, to crawl the English tweets
containing the word “eclipse” from the entire duration of the event (from Aug. 20, 2017 to
Aug. 24, 2017). The collected tweets were formatted in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
files with named attributes and associated values [116]. After removing bots, we put together
5.97 million tweets including original tweets, replies, retweets, and quoted tweets, and 1.17
million unique tweets after deleting retweets.

4.2.2

Geographic Distribution Overview

Although this solar eclipse’s path of totality was mainly across the U.S., it attracted
worldwide attention. Figure 4.2(a) shows that the tweets mentioning the English word
“eclipse” come from 168 countries, even including non-English speaking countries like China
and Japan. It is not surprising that a majority (89.5%) of collected tweets come from the
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(a) Across the world [112]

(b) Across the U.S. [56]

Figure 4.1: Path of the eclipse shadow across the world and United States. The narrow
tracks are called the path of totality. Small blue dots inside the narrow track in (b) refer to
U.S. cities. The highlighted states in (b) represent areas where total solar eclipse was visible.

(a) World distribution

(b) Percentage by state

(c) Normalized by POP

Figure 4.2: Worldwide and national spatial distribution of tweets. (a) The U.S. contributes
more than 89% tweets. (b) States with a large population contribute more. (c) States along
the path of totality tweet more per million people.
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United States. Canada (3.4%) ranks as the second and was followed by Britain (2.1%). Any
other country except the above three ones accounts for less than 0.4%.
Therefore, we focused on the U.S. to study the spatial distribution of eclipse-tagged
tweets at the national level. Figure 4.2(b) illustrates the states with a large population,
such as California, Texas, and New York, contribute most tweets. It is impressive that, after
normalizing the number of tweets by the resident population per state [93], those states
along the solar eclipse’s path of totality became dominating, which indicates that on average
people staying close to the path are more likely to share this event on Twitter.

4.2.3

Interstate and Intrastate Human Movement

During The 2017 Great American Eclipse, it was reported millions of people traveled to chase
this natural event in the path of totality. We analyzed human travel behaviors based on two
types of Twitter geographical information, namely, profile locations and tweet locations.
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of tweets geo-tagged with exact latitude and longitude
coordinates. In our dataset, most of such tweets are posted either along the eclipse’s path of
totality, or from densely populated largest cities such as New York City, Boston, Washington,
D.C., Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. The dense distributions in less populated
states such as Idaho, Wyoming, and Missouri inspired us to study how people travel between
states. On the other hand, the overcrowded distributions in Tennessee, Oregon, South
Carolina, and Georgia where the path of totality crossed motivated us to look deeper into
people’s movements inside states.
Interstate Movement
We treated Twitter users’ profile locations as their places of residence. If Twitter users posted
eclipse-related tweets outside the state of residence, we assumed they traveled between states
to chase the eclipse. Table 4.1 illustrates the 20 most popular interstate trips for chasing
eclipse. The destinations of red trips are states where the total solar eclipse occurred. On
the contrary, the blue ones represent cross-state travel towards states where the only partial
eclipse was visible. It is interesting to note that the top three blue trajectories, i.e., New York
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of tweets with exact latitude and longitude coordinates.

Table 4.1: The 20 most frequent Interstate movements
From
California
Washington
North Carolina
New York
D.C.
D.C.
Florida
New York
Colorado
Utah

To
Oregon
Oregon
S. Carolina
New Jersey
Virginia
Maryland
S. Carolina
California
Wyoming
Idaho

Count
252
176
131
122
101
84
80
79
78
77
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From
Pennsylvania
D.C.
California
Florida
Missouri
New York
New York
New York
Georgia
Texas

To
New Jersey
Washington
Texas
Georgia
Kansas
S. Carolina
Florida
Tennessee
S. Carolina
Tennessee

Count
71
66
66
62
60
57
55
54
52
52

→ New Jersey, D.C. → Virginia, and D.C. → Maryland, are more likely to be generated by
commuters because these pairs of states are so close to each other that people may even live
and work in two different states.
We then visualized the 50 most frequent interstate trips, as shown in Figure 4.4. The
red arrows represent the trajectories to states through which the eclipse’s path of totality
crossed. The blue arrows are the trajectories to states where the total eclipse did not occur.
The width of the arrows indicts the frequencies of travels. The red arrows dominate the
blue ones greatly, suggesting people did prefer states where the totality can be observed.
However, the red coast-to-coast movements are less than the blue ones, which infers that
most people probably chase the eclipse in nearby states instead of far-away states.
Finally, we summarized all 10,334 interstate trips of Twitter users during the event with
respect to destination states, origin states, and interstate travel likelihoods. Figure 4.5(a)
shows that all of the three most attractive destinations, i.e., Oregon, South Carolina, and
Tennessee, are located in the path of totality, where people can experience the totality. The
eight most popular origin states except Washington, D.C. have the largest populations, as
demonstrated in Figure 4.5(b). However, after normalizing the number of interstate trips
by state populations, we find the two most active origin states are Delaware and Wyoming
which have the seventh least and the first least population among all states (see the number
of people taking interstate trips per million people in Figure 4.5(c)). In addition, it seems
that people living in the northern parts of the U.S. made more frequent interstate trips on
average during this event.
Intrastate Movement
To further investigate the chasing behaviors at a detailed level, we select four states, i.e.,
Tennessee, Oregon, South Carolina, and Georgia along the eclipse totality path to study
human intrastate movements. As shown in Figure 4.6, people also sought to find a suitable
place to watch the eclipse inside states for convenience. In all of the four states, most
of the starting locations are from major cities. To be more specific, Twitter users living
in Nashville, Knoxville, Memphis and Chattanooga in Tennessee, Portland and Eugene in
Oregon, Atlanta in Georgia, and Columbia, Charleston, and Greenville in South Carolina,
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Figure 4.4: The 50 most popular interstate trips during the event.

(a) Destination states

(b) Origin states

(c) # trips per million people

Figure 4.5: Interstate movement

(a) Tennessee

(b) Oregon

(c) South Carolina

Figure 4.6: Intrastate movement
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(d) Georgia

were more likely to take a trip to chase the eclipse. Directions of intrastate movements are
generally towards the path of totality. For example, Twitter users in Atlanta trended to
move to the northeast board of Georgia where the total eclipse occurred. It should be noted
that moving ranges of all three major cities in South Carolina are much smaller than cities
in other states, which could be explained by the fact that all of the three cities were located
in the path of totality.

4.3

Geographic Patterns of Petitions for New Emojis
on Twitter

4.3.1

Background and Tweet Collection

As the usage of emojis (and social media in general) evolves, new emojis are being
continuously requested.

According to the Emogi Research Team [109], 75% of mobile

messaging app users were interested in having more emoji options, and this demand is
more intense for those who more frequently use mobile messaging. Every year, the Unicode
Consortium1 updates the official list of Unicode emojis by judging and accepting proposals
for new emojis from individuals, organizations and companies. For each candidate emoji,
its evidence of frequency from Google Search, Bing Search, YouTube Search, and Google
Trends must be submitted, and evidences from NGram Viewer and Wikipedia Search are
optional. Besides the substantial efforts needed to collect such evidences, this method has
several additional drawbacks. First, objects with higher search frequency does not always
imply better fit as emojis. For example, although the word “mascot” is heavily searched, it is
unlikely to be an emoji because there exists no specific image that can represent all mascots
for different teams, events, organizations and universities. Second, this method completely
ignores new emoji petitions directly generated by actual users, whereas users have first-hand
information regarding the usage context and could contribute tremendously to generating
valuable ideas. These users do not necessarily know how or have the time to make an official
1

https://unicode.org/emoji/
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request. For example, Figure 4.7 shows a tweet, in which the poster comments that the daisy
emoji does not exist and wonders how to get one.
To more comprehensively study the emoji requests, we investigate more than thirty
million tweets mentioning the word “emoji,” collected from Oct. 2017 to Oct. 2018. First,
we extract the requested emoji descriptions and calculate their corresponding frequencies.
After filtering out emojis that already existed (i.e., extant emoji requests) and exploring
why they were still being requested, we propose a WordNet [82] based emoji classifier to
cluster requested emojis. Then, we study spatiotemporal patterns of these requests and
explore possible reasons why new emojis were requested. In addition, we illustrate the
existing relatedness, fairness, and equality problems reflected through emojis, and discuss
the positive impacts of new emojis on society. Finally, we develop a web-based interactive
emoji petition tracker — https://call4emoji.org, which allows users to analyze petitioned
emojis in a real-time manner. In the following sections, we mainly focus on the geographic
patterns of new emoji petitions.

4.3.2

Geographic Patterns

In our collected dataset, 2.8% tweets have geo tags. We use these geo-tagged tweets to
profile geographic distributions of new emoji requests at both worldwide and national levels.
The worldwide distribution of expected emojis is illustrated in Figure 4.8(a), where people
in as many as 110 different countries petition for new emojis. As we collect tweets written
in English, English-speaking countries, such as United States (73.6%), United Kingdom
(10.9%), and Canada (3.2%), contribute the most of emoji requests. It is interesting that
non-native English-speaking countries, such as China, Japan, Brazil and Mexico, also express
their desires for new emojis even in English, which might be one evidence of the world’s
passion for emojis.
Since the most requests were made in the United States, we then focus on the United
States to explore the geographic distribution of emoji requests at the national level.
Figure 4.8(b) shows the proportion of new emoji requests per state to the overall number
of nation-wide emoji requests. As expected, states like California, Texas, New York and
Florida make a large number of requests, while those states lying at the heartland have low
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Figure 4.7: A sample emoji request

(a) Worldwide emoji
proportions per country

request (b) Emoji request proportions per (c) Emoji request proportions
state in U.S.
normalized to populations

Figure 4.8: Geographic distributions. (a) English emoji requests are made from 110
countries, and the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada account for more than 80%
emoji requests. (b) States with large populations request more emojis than those having
small populations. (c) After normalizing requests using the state-wise population, states
show similar patterns.
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requesting percentages. We think this uneven distribution is mainly caused by the different
populations in these regions. After normalizing by state population [93], the geographical
distribution as shown in Figure 4.8(c) is relatively smooth and even across the country,
which indicates that people in different states have a similar level of desire for new emojis.
Note that we also conduct the national geographic distribution analysis using Twitter users’
profile locations, which are the residential locations specified in their public account profiles,
and obtain similar results.

4.3.3

Place-Related Emoji Petitions

When analyzing the context of emoji requests, we found the location was one of the factors
motivating people to call for new emojis. Places of interests at different levels, like a single
landmark, tourist attractions, and even regions or countries, may encourage users to seek
new place-related emojis. Many Twitter users visiting Paris claimed for an Eiffel Tower
emoji, like “Paris first though!! why’s there no Eiffel Tower emoji?!”. Similarly, the Mickey
and Minnie emoji was requested at Walt Disney World (WDW) Resort like “Guess where I
am?!!! WDW (why is there no Mickey and Minnie emoji?!)”. People living in Hawaii and
Texas asked for their state flag emojis respectively.

4.4

Geographic Analyses on Shared Dockless Electric
Scooter Deployment

4.4.1

Background and Tweet Collection

Micromobility is an emerging term usually referring to the usage of docked and dockless
lightweight devices (e.g., bikes) for short- and medium-length trips. As a new mode of
micromobility, shared dockless electric scooters (e-scooters) are gaining popularity in recent
years. A recent survey conducted in February 2019 showed 11% of Paris residents reported
using e-scooters either frequently or from time to time [85]. Aiming at closing first- and lastmile transit gaps for residents, many ridesharing companies, such as Lime, Bird, and Lyft,
deployed thousands of e-scooters in more than 60 cities across the United States. According
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to the National Association of City Transportation Officials (NACTO) [86], people took 38.5
million trips on shared e-scooters in 2018.
Smartphones are one of the key enablers of e-scooter sharing service. To ride a shared
e-scooter, users must download e-scooter apps, sign up, input payment information, and
scan a QR code to unlock the e-scooter. On e-scooter apps, riders can check ready-to-go
e-scooters parked nearby. After finishing the trip, riders make a payment on the app, and
the e-scooter is locked automatically. However, most existing e-scooter studies ignored the
feature that e-scooters must be operated through smartphones, leading to a missing research
perspective from the riders’ comments shared via smartphones, especially on social networks.
We chose to use Twitter as our lens to examine shared e-scooters comprehensively through
big social data analytics. Specifically, we monitored and tracked 5.8 million English tweets
mentioning the word “scooter” or the scooter emoji

via the Twitter Streaming APIs in a

real-time manner from October 6, 2018 to March 14, 2020. After cleaning data, we presented
an overview of temporal (both monthly and hourly) and geospatial tweet distributions.

4.4.2

Geo-enabled Temporal Distribution

We profiled the temporal distributions of e-scooter related tweets using two time
granularities, i.e., by month and by hour. Figure 4.9(a) and 4.9(b) illustrate the monthly
percentage of posted tweets by different countries.

Followed by New Zealand, United

Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, the United States accounts for more than 82% of all
collected tweets. As shown in Figure 4.9(a), months in summer contributed the highest
monthly data volumes in the United States in 2019. There is a significant drop when
comparing data volumes in Nov. and Dec. 2019 with that in Nov. and Dec. 2018. We
think such a drop may be caused by two reasons. First, e-scooter users are more likely to
discuss their riding experience online when trying e-scooters for the first time. Second, strict
e-scooter regulations and policies, such as limiting the number of companies authorized to
operate scooters in each city, had been imposed in many U.S. cities in 2019.
Besides the United States, we investigated the monthly data distributions of other seven
countries in Figure 4.9(b). The two peaks in New Zealand and Canada occur in local
summer months, which may indicate that e-scooters are used more frequently during summer.
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Figure 4.9: Time distribution from Oct. 6, 2018 to Mar. 14, 2020. The data of Oct. 2018
and Mar. 2020 are not plotted in (a) and (b) due to the data incompleteness.

Together with New Zealand, Australia shows a decreasing trend regarding the monthly data
volume. On the contrary, Germany and India demonstrate an increasing trend. The amount
of e-scooter tweets posted per month from United Kingdom and France are relatively stable.
We also explored the hourly tweet distributions regarding both workdays and weekends
in the United States, as shown in Figure 4.9(c). As we expected, the tweet amount on every
day is lower between 0:00 am and 7:00 am than that in the daytime. The most active time
during weekdays is between 10:00 am to 17:00 pm (see the orange line). However, the peak
time on weekends is between 12:00 pm and 19:00 pm (see the blue line). One possible reason
is that many riders tend to start their outdoor activities later on Saturday and Sunday.

4.4.3

E-Scooter Deployment in the United States

We selected the United States as an example to study the geospatial distribution of escooter related tweets at the state level. The percentage of tweets posted from each state
in the United States is demonstrated in Figure 4.10(a), where California (28.8%) and Texas
(11.7%) account for more than 40% of all tweets. We also noticed six (CA, TX, GA, FL,
NC, OH) out of the top ten states with the highest percentages were among the ten most
populous states. After normalizing by state population, we obtained a relatively smooth
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distribution, as shown in Figure 4.10(b). It is interesting to note that Washington D.C., one
of the least populated states, generated the highest number of tweets per million residents.
McKenzie [81] reported that scooter-share trips in Washington D.C. supported leisure,
recreation, or tourism activities more than commuting, which may explain our findings.
We leveraged tweets geo-tagged with precise GPS (lat, lon) coordinates to explore
the scooter deployment in cities.

Within the United States, we collected 3359 exact

GPS coordinates located in 579 cities. The exact GPS coordinates are demonstrated in
Figure 4.11(a), where a deeper color indicates a higher GPS data density. Figure 4.11(b)
shows the GPS data distribution aggregated by county. From the two figures, we can see
that most extensive scooter deployments occurred in large cities at East Coast and West
Coast, and other metropolises of the United States. Three cities in California contributed
more than 15.6% of all GPS-tagged tweets – Los Angeles with a proportion of 7.9%, San
Francisco (4.2%), and San Diego (3.5%). Washington D.C.(2.1%), New York (2.1%), and
Miami (1.5%) ranked as the top three in the east coast cities. In addition, scooters were
also very popular in metropolises including Chicago (2.6%), Austin (2.4%), Nashville (2.3%),
Atlanta (2.2%), Dallas (1.7%), and Denver (1.5%).

(a) Percentage by state

(b) Normalized by state population

Figure 4.10: Geospatial distribution across United States
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(a) Exact (lat, lon) coordinates

(b) Geospatial distribution by county

Figure 4.11: Distribution of scooter tweets with exact GPS coordinates at the city level

4.5

A Fine-Grained View of COVID-19 via Geo-tagged
Tweets

4.5.1

Background and Tweet Collection

The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic transformed daily human lives globally.
According to local pandemic conditions, countries worldwide adopted diverse regional
regulations and policies to protect their residents and slow down the spread of COVID19. Although countries like Sweden and South Korea did not lock down cities during the
pandemic, most of the other countries, including China, Italy, Spain, and India imposed
long and stringent lockdowns to restrict gathering and social contact. Inside the same
country, different strategies and responses were also made by regions and cities at varying
paces to fight against the COVID-19 crisis.

Furthermore, people from different areas

may express distinct attitudes and emotions on similar COVID-19 regulations due to local
hospital resources, economic statuses, demographics, and many other geographic factors.
Therefore, it is reasonable and necessary to take the location information into account when
investigating COVID-19.
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We took the U.S. as an example and built a large geo-tagged Twitter dataset for
fine-grained investigations of the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, we utilized Twitter’s
Streaming APIs to crawl real-time tweets containing a set of “coronavirus”, “wuhan”,
“corona”, “nCoV” keywords related to the novel coronavirus outbreak since January 25,
2020.2

After the World Health Organization (WHO) announced the official name of

COVID-19 on February 11, 2020, we added “COVID19”, “COVIDー19”, “coronapocalypse”,
“Coronavid19”, “Covid 19”, “COVID-19”, and “covid” into our keyword set. We collected
more than 170 million tweets generated by 2.7 million unique users from January 25 to May
10, 2020. We lost 38.5% tweets uniformly distributed among May 18 and Apr. 4 due to
corrupted files, and missed 88 hours of data because of intermittent internet connectivity
issues in the entire data collection period. To compensate for these data gaps, we sought for
the COVID-19 dataset maintained by Chen et al. [20] and downloaded 16,459,659 tweets. We
detected and examined the “place” attribute in collected tweet JSON files. If the embedded
“country code” was “US” and the extracted state was among the 50 states and Washington
D.C. in the United States, we added the tweet into our geo-tagged dataset. After removing
retweets, 650,563 geo-tagged unique tweets in the United States were collected. Among
them, 38,818 tweets (5.96% of our dataset) were retrieved from the dataset proposed by
Chen et al. [20]

4.5.2

Temporal and Geographic Distributions

Monthly and Daily Patterns
The monthly number of geo-tagged tweets in each state is shown in Figure 4.12, where March
and April contributed the most tweet volumes. Figure 4.13 shows the daily distribution of
geo-tagged tweets within the top 10 states, where Twitter users were most active. We lost
around one-third detailed tweets between Mar. 18 and Apr. 4 due to the corrupted data. But
we recorded the daily tweet counts during this period (see the dashed lines in Figure 4.13).
Our crawlers shut down for 8 hours and 9 hours On Mar. 27 and Apr. 23 respectively, which
caused the data gaps in the two days. Figure 4.13 demonstrates that daily tweet volumes
2

This is two days after Wuhan lockdown.
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Figure 4.12: The monthly number of geo-tagged tweets in 50 states and Washington D.C.
in the United States.
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Figure 4.13: The daily number of tweets from the top 10 states generating most tweets.
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generated by different states show similar trends. In fact, we tested statistical relationships
regarding the daily volumes over time for all pairs of two arbitrary states, and found strong
linear correlations existed among 93.2% state pairs with a Pearson’s r > 0.8 and p < 0.001.
The daily patterns (if there was no corrupted data) inspired us to split the whole timeline
into the following three phases. Phase 1 (from Jan. 25 to Feb. 24): people mentioned little
about COVID-19 except for a small peak at the end of Jan; Phase 2 (from Feb. 25 to Mar.
14): the number of COVID-19 related tweets began to increase quickly, as many states had
declared a state of emergency since Washington state did it on Feb. 29. Phase 3 (from Mar.
15 to May 10): people began to adjust to the new normal caused by COVID-19, such as
working from home and city lockdowns.
Hourly Patterns
We also examined hourly tweeting distributions based on local time zones, as shown in
Figure 4.14. The tweeting behaviors on workdays and weekends were studied separately
because we wanted to figure out how the working status impacted on tweeting patterns. In
Phase 1, there exists a tweeting gap from 8:00 to 16:59 between workdays and weekends.
The tweeting peak occurred at 12:00-12:59 on weekends but at 17:00-17:59 on workdays. We
think it may be explained by the fact that people engage at work during regular working
hours and have little time to post tweets on workdays. But they become free to tweet
concerns on COVID-19 after work. The hourly distribution patterns changed in Phase 2 when
confirmed COVID-19 cases increased quickly in the United States. People posted COVID-19
tweets more frequently during business hours than at the same time slots on weekends. It
is interesting to notice that a tweeting gap from 8:00 to 16:59, which is similar to that in
Phase 1, reappeared in Phase 3 when most people had worked from home. These findings
motivated us to take advantage of the tweeting frequencies on workdays and weekends to
estimate work engagement in the future.
State-level Distribution
We extracted the state information from both general and exact tweet locations and
calculated tweet volume percentages for each state, as shown in Figure 4.15(a). The most
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Figure 4.14: Hourly distribution in three phases: Phase 1 (Jan. 25 - Feb. 24), Phase 2 (Feb.
25 - Mar. 14), Phase 3 (Mar. 15 - May 10).
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Figure 4.15: State-level geospatial distribution of geo-tagged tweets across the United States
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populated states, i.e., California, Texas, New York, and Florida, contributed the most tweets.
In contrast, less populated states such as Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, and South
Dakota created the least tweets. We measured the relationship between tweet volumes and
populations for all states, and found a strong linear correlation existed (Pearson’s r = 0.977
and p < 0.001).
Then we normalized tweet volumes using state residential populations. Figure 4.15(b)
illustrates Washington D.C. posted the highest volume of tweets by every 1000 residents,
followed by Nevada, New York, California, and Maryland. The rest states demonstrate
similar patterns. We think the top ranking of Washington D.C. might be caused by its
functionality serving as a political center, where COVID-19 news and policies were spawned.
Unlike state populations, we did not find strong correlations between tweet counts and
cumulative confirmed COVID-19 cases (Pearson’s r = 0.544 and p < 0.001) or deaths
(Pearson’s r = 0.450 and p < 0.001). We further normalized tweet volumes based on COVID19 cumulative number of cases and deaths in each state. Figure 4.15(c) and Figure 4.15(d)
shows the average number of tweets generated by each COVID-19 case and each death.
Note that Hawaii and Alaska (not plotted in Figure 4.15(c) and Figure 4.15(d)) ranked as
the first and second in both scenarios. Residents in states like Oregon, Montana, Texas, and
California reacted sensitively to both confirmed cases and deaths, as these states dominated
in Figure 4.15(c) and Figure 4.15(d).
County-level Distribution
We utilized GPS locations to profile the geographic distribution of COVID-19 tweets at
the county level because general tweet locations might not contain county information. In
our collected geo-tagged tweets, 3.95% of them contained GPS locations. We resorted to
Nominatim [87], a search engine for OpenStreetMap data, to identify the counties where
each tweet GPS coordinate lay. Figure 4.16(a) and Figure 4.16(b) visualize the raw GPS
coordinate and corresponding county distributions. Large cities in each state demonstrated
a higher tweeting density than small ones. In fact, we found a strong correlations between
GPS-tagged tweet counts and county populations (Pearson’s r = 0.871 and p < 0.001). But
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(a) Exact (lat, lon) coordinates

(b) Geospatial distribution by county

Figure 4.16: Distribution of tweets tagged with exact GPS coordinates at the county level
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such correlations did not hold true for cumulative confirmed COVID-19 cases (Pearson’s
r = 0.590 and p < 0.001) or deaths (Pearson’s r = 0.497 and p < 0.001).

4.5.3

Potential Privacy Leakage

Many states imposed stay-at-home orders during the COVID-19 pandemic, confining people
at home for months. We think GPS tagged tweets during this period are more likely to leak
precise private location information, such as home addresses. Table 4.2 illustrate the top 20
parsed OpenStreetMap key-value results of GPS locations in our dataset. All of the three
most popular key-value pairs, namely place-house, building-yes, and highway-residential, can
be home locations (see Figure 4.17(a), Figure 4.17(b), Figure 4.17(c)). Note that building-yes
determines the location is a building but cannot provide more specific building types. The
key-value of highway-residential represents roads that are used for accessing residential areas
and in residential areas. We also found home locations in the category of building-house (see
Figure 4.17(d)).
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Table 4.2: OpenStreetMap key-value results of GSP tagged tweets
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Key
place
building
highway
amenity
highway
amenity
highway
amenity
highway
building

Value
house
yes
residential
restaurant
secondary
school
primary
place of worship
tertiary
commercial

Count
3799
1432
530
320
202
197
196
188
155
152

Rank
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Key
amenity
shop
building
tourism
building
highway
amenity
amenity
amenity
amenity

Value
Count
hospital
150
supermarket 139
house
133
hotel
114
apartments 108
motorway
104
fast food
93
university
91
townhall
84
cafe
80

(a) Home location in place-house category

(b) Home location in building-yes category

(c) Home location in highway-residence category

(d) Home location in building-house category

Figure 4.17: Home location examples on Google Map
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Chapter 5
Secure Sharing of Private Locations
through Homomorphic Bloom Filters
In this chapter, we investigate the problem on how to keep users’ location data secure, while
at the same time allowing servers to perform basic operations on the data. We demonstrate
secure computation primitives on location data where the servers should have no knowledge
of the plaintext, i.e., the servers should not even keep the private keys to decrypt data. In this
way, compromised servers will not cause leaked user data. We have proposed a generalized
secure set membership check framework based on the recently developed homomorphic
encryption and an advanced data structure called the bloom filter.

We also use real-

world datasets to evaluate the proposed practical prototypes, which are implemented on
the open-source homomorphic libraries. The preliminary results demonstrate the feasibility
and efficiency of the proposed approach as well as the security of the protocol designs. Note
that this chapter is based on my published paper:
Secure Sharing of Private Locations through Homomorphic Bloom Filters. IEEE 4th
International Conference on Big Data Security on Cloud (BigDataSecurity, Best Paper
Award), 2018.
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5.1
5.1.1

Background and Framework Overview
Assumptions

Our system design consists of three parties: Alice, Bob, and the aggregation server. In
a typical application scenario, Alice first selectively publishes her location datasets after
encrypting them with her public key. Later, another user Bob sends his location queries
encrypted by Alice’s public key to the aggregation server. The server is responsible for
performing computation tasks on the encrypted data, and sends the (still encrypted) results
to Alice. Finally, Alice decides if there is an intersection by decrypting the results via her
own private key. We assume that Alice and Bob are usually not malicious. They will follow
the protocol correctly, but once the protocol has ended they can perform any computation
they want on the information (encrypted or otherwise). If Alice finds out that there is an
intersection with the trajectory of the query, the further interactions between Alice and Bob
are out of the scope of this protocol.

5.1.2

Background

As shown in Figure 5.1, the homomorphic encryption method and the bloom filter are the
two core components in our protocol. Next, we give a little background information about
the two components.
Homomorphic Encryption: This method takes a foundational role in our system.
Briefly, in a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, the following equations hold true:
m1 + m2 = D(E(m1 ) + E(m2 ))

(5.1)

m1 ∗ m2 = D(E(m1 ) ∗ E(m2 ))

(5.2)

In these equations, E() represents the encryption operation, and D() represents the
decryption operation. The computation that is performed with encrypted values can be
translated to operations in the plain text domain. This allows parties to perform blind
computation on encrypted values.
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Figure 5.1: Computational model architecture

Bloom Filter: We use standard notations on bloom filters to represent their operations,
as follows:
• m: the size (total number of bits) of the bloom filter;
• k: the number of hash functions;
• n: the number of elements inserted in the bloom filter;
• p: the false positive probability of the bloom filter;
• t: the number of bits flipped to one.
The probability of false positives p given a parameter setting (m, k, n) is calculated as:
p ≈ (1 − e
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−kn
m

)k

(5.3)

For a given bloom filter size m and the number of inserted elements n, the number of
hash functions k that minimizes the false positive is:
k=

m
ln 2
n

(5.4)

For a given number of inserted elements n and the desired false positive p, the required
number of bits m is:
m=−

n ln p
(ln 2)2

(5.5)

We use these results later for parameter settings and the performance analysis of our
protocol in Section 5.4.

5.1.3

Main Ideas on an Ideal Protocol

The main idea for an ideal protocol works as follows. The user Alice first inserts all locations
that she wants to publish into a configured bloom filter BFA , by hashing each of these
locations k times into BFA , and flipping corresponding bits as 1. After all locations are
inserted, suppose that t bits at index a1 , a2 , . . . , at in BFA have been set as 1s. Our next
goal is to encrypt the bloom filter BFA properly. Specifically, we observe that its flipped
bits can be represented as a polynomial:
t
Y
f (x) =
(x − ai )

(5.6)

i=1

Alice then sends the encrypted polynomial f (x) either in the product form or the
expanded form to the aggregation server. Alice also sends the details on the k hash functions,
and the configuration parameters for BFA . This is necessary as such information will be later
used by Bob for encryption needs. Even though Alice sends the hash functions, as the f (x)
is encrypted with the public key, the aggregation server has no way to learn which bits have
been set as 1s in BFA .
The aggregation server next waits for the incoming queries. When doing the query, Bob
does not send the raw location data to the server. Instead, he will first construct a new
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bloom filter BFB by obtaining the k hash functions and BFA ’s configuration parameters
from the server. Then the queried location is hashed into BFB by flipping k bits at index
b1 , b2 , . . . , bk . Next, Bob encrypts the k indices as E(b1 ), E(b2 ), . . . , E(bk ) using Alice’s public
key, and sends them to the server to check whether BFA has the corresponding bits flipped
as 1s by evaluating f (x) in the encrypted form as E(f (E(bi ))). We know that, based on the
nature of this encryption method, the following equation also holds true:
D(E(f (E(bi )))) = f (bi )

(5.7)

Furthermore, if the bit at index bi in BFA has been flipped to 1 by Alice earlier, this
evaluation result must be 0 based on the product nature of the polynomial. Therefore,
P
if we construct another polynomial as ki=1 E(f (E(bi ))2 ) (we use square is to prevent the
evaluation may sometimes lead to negative numbers), we have:

H(b) = D(

k
X

2

E(f (E(bi )) )) =

i=1

k
X

f (bi )2

(5.8)

i=1

Observe that in this equation, only when all bits at the k indices in BFA have been flipped
to 1, the result H(b) will be 0. If H(b) is not 0, then it means that the query is not in the
bloom filter of Alice. We note that the multiplication steps for computing f (bi )2 is t (based
on the factorized form of f (x)). So the total time of multiplication involved in computing
H(b) is O(k ∗t). A large t, like 200, makes such a multiplication impractical, because the fast
increased size of ciphertexts worsens the computation overhead greatly. Some techniques,
such as relinearization [11] and approximate eigenvector method [38], have been proposed to
balance the multiplication computation capacity and computation overhead, but they still
do not work efficiently on a huge multiplication depth in real applications. Therefore, we
design the following optimizations towards practical protocols containing a greatly reduced
number of multiplication operations. With these optimizations, the protocols can be made
practical. We call these protocols practical optimizations for this reason.
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5.2
5.2.1

Optimized Protocols
Optimization 1: A Lightweight Homomorphic Bloom Filter

We now describe the first working design using fewer additions and multiplications compared
with the idealized design above. Specifically, it requires k additions, no multiplication and
one decryption to speed up the query. The pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 2. Alice first
inserts her locations into a bloom filter BFA using k hash functions, then encrypts the value
of every bit v1 , v2 , . . . , vm in BFA using her public key P K. The E(v) is then submitted
to the aggregation server. Next, Bob hashes his queried location into BFB , a bloom filter
configured with the same parameters as BFA , where the bits at index b1 , b2 , . . . , bk are flipped
to 1s. These k indices are submitted to the server in plaintext, which we think is still safe
because the chosen k cryptographic hash functions ensure that the server can hardly compute
the plain text from hashed values reversely. The server then sums all elements in E(v) whose
index is in b. At last, the server subtracts k, i.e., the length of b, from the sum and returns
the ciphertext result to Alice for decryption using her secret key SK. The whole evaluation
and decryption can be expressed as follows:

plain result = D(

k
X

E(vbj ) − k)

(5.9)

j=1

If plain result equals 0, it implies that all values of vbj are same and equal 1. In other
words, all bits at index bj in BFA are flipped as 1s. So, we can say Bob interacts Alice with
a certain probability of false positive expressed by Equation 5.3. Otherwise, they do not
intersect at the queried location 100%.

5.2.2

Optimization 2: An Improved Homomorphic Bloom Filter

To further improve the security of Bob’s data in optimization O1, we propose an improved
design as shown in Algorithm 3. Like optimization O1, Alice first inserts her locations into
a bloom filter BFA , where t bits at index a1 , a2 , . . . , at have been set as 1s. Then Alice
uses her public key P K to encrypt each negated ai as the encrypted E(−ai ), and submits
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Algorithm 2: A Lightweight Design of the Homomorphic Bloom Filter
Data: BFA : Alice’s Bloom filter; P K: Alice’s public key; SK: Alice’s secret key;
BFB : Bob’s Bloom filter.
Parameter: k: the number of hash functions; m: the size of BFA
1
2
3
4
5

6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19

Alice: Bloom Filter Encryption
v ← all bits in BFA ;
for i = 1 → m do // m is the size of BFA
E(vi ) ← encrypt vi using P K ;
end
send E(v) to the aggregation server ;
Bob: Query Encryption
b ← the indices of bits flipped to 1s in BFB ;
send b to the aggregation server ;
Sever: Evaluation
sum ← 0 ;
for j = 1 → k do
sum ← sum + E(vbj ) ;
end
cipher result ← sum − k ;
send cipher result to Alice ;
Alice: Result Decryption
plain result ← decrypt cipher result using SK ;
if plain result = 0 then
return intersection exists ;
else
return no intersection ;
end
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Algorithm 3: An Improved Design of the Homomorphic Bloom Filter
Data: BFA : Alice’s Bloom filter; P K: Alice’s public key; SK: Alice’s secret key;
BFB : Bob’s Bloom filter.
Parameter: k: the number of hash functions; t: the number of bits flipped as 1 in
BFA
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Alice: Bloom Filter Encryption
a ← the indices where bits are flipped to 1s in BFA ;
for i = 1 → t do
E(−ai ) ← encrypt −ai using P K ;
end
send E(−a) to the aggregation server ;
Bob: Query Encryption
b ← the indices where bits are flipped to 1s in BFB ;
for j = 1 → k do
E(bj ) ← encrypt bj using P K ;
end
send E(b) to the aggregation server ;
Sever: Evaluation
for j = 1 → k do
for i = 1 → t do
cipher resultij ← (E(bj ) + E(−ai )) ∗ z ;
end
end
send cipher result to Alice ;
Alice: Result Decryption
for j = 1 → k do
f lag ← F ALSE ;
for i = 1 → t do
plain resultij ← decrypt cipher resultij using SK ;
if plain resultij = 0 then
f lag ← T RU E ;
break ;
end
end
if f lag = F ALSE then
return no intersection ;
end
end
return intersection exists ;
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them to the aggregation server. After launching a query, Bob first requests Alice’s P K and
her k hash functions from the aggregation server. Then Bob hashes his queried location
into BFB with flipping bits at index b1 , b2 , . . . , bk to 1s. The indices are then encrypted as
E(b1 ), E(b2 ), . . . , E(bk ) by P K and sent to the server. Once receiving the encrypted query
from Bob, the server starts the evaluation based on E(−a) and E(b). Specifically, for each
E(bj ), the server performs E(bj ) + E(−ai ), where i = 1, 2, . . . , t, and gets t encrypted results
which are then decrypted as D(E(bj ) + E(−ai )) respectively by Alice using her secret key
SK. Once one of the t encrypted results of bj equals 0, it means the bit at index bj in BFA
is set as 1. If all bits at index b1 , b2 , . . . , bk in BFA are set as 1s, we can conclude Bob has
an interaction with Alice at a certain confidence level which is determined by BFA ’s rate
of false positives (we analyze the impact of this false positive rate later). Otherwise, Bob
has no intersection with Alice at the queried location 100%. Note that in this design, the
information of Bob might still be leaked to Alice no matter whether they have trajectory
intersections or not, because Alice can obtain the value of bj by:
Pt
[D(E(bj ) + E(−ai )) + ai ]
bj = i=1
t

(5.10)

To address this problem, we introduce the randomness during the evaluation by
multiplying E(bj ) + E(−ai ) by a random positive integer z. Thus, if D(E(bj ) + E(−ai ))
equals 0, D((E(bj ) + E(−ai )) ∗ z) still equals 0, while other values vary dramatically.

5.2.3

Optimization 3: A Bit-wise Homomorphic Bloom Filter

Although the optimization O1 and O2 are feasible, they are built entirely on top of the
underlying homomorphic encryption scheme, and treat such a scheme as a black box. The
advantage of doing this is that even if we change the implementation of the homomorphic
encryption, these designs still work without any modification.
However, we also observe that the recently proposed homomorphic encryption schemes
are usually based on bit-wise operations, a feature that is highly similar to the underlying
scheme of bloom filters. This similarity reveals an opportunity for cross-layer optimization.
Specifically, a large number of homomorphic encryption schemes encrypt data in a bitwise manner, i.e., each bit in the plaintext is encrypted as a separate ciphertext. Later,
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Figure 5.2: Bloom filter encrypts a query with the bit-wise encryption scheme

the computation is represented as a boolean circuit with XOR and AND gates, where the
input is the ciphertext for each encrypted bit. As this mechanism breaks down an arbitrary
computation into bit operations, it may lead to highly complex circuits. However, in our case,
after transforming the original query operation that involves several arithmetic operations
into the query operation based on bloom filter, the query operation can be easily decomposed
to a single bit-wise operation.
We represent the bloom filter as a bit array, which can in turn be represented as an array
of integers. We then use the integer array as encryption input, and are able to naturally
obtain the encrypted bloom filter without using the polynomial methods as developed
in the previous subsections. Specifically, we re-design the query operation as shown in
Figure 5.2. Suppose Alice constructs a bloom filter BFA with all her location dataset. Bob
also constructs a bloom filter BFB with only the location he wants to query. To check
whether the location queried by Bob exists in Alice’s location set, we only need to check if
all bits flipped as 1s in BFB are also set as 1s in BFA , which can be decomposed into two
bit-wise operations. First, perform a bit-wise AND operation between the two bloom filters
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to get a bit array containing wanted bits in BFA . Then, perform a bit-wise XOR operation
between BFB and the resulting bit array from the last step to check whether all wanted bits
are set as 1. Therefore, the query operation can be expressed as:

query result = BFA &BFB ⊕ BFB

(5.11)

If the queried location of Bob exists in Alice’s location set, the query result in
Equation 5.11 will be zero. (Equation 5.11 will fail when both bloom filters are empty,
i.e., both Alice and Bob have no trajectory, but this can be easily prevented.) Furthermore,
the operation can be simplified as:

query result = ¬BFA &BFB

(5.12)

Note that the bit-wise NOT operation only requires one input, thus can be performed locally
before the encryption occurs. This can further reduce the required operation overhead under
encryption form.
With Equation 5.5, we can calculate the optimal m given a certain number of elements
n and required false positive level p. We use l to represent the length of an integer. Then
the system needs to encrypt dm/le integers. During the query, the system needs to calculate
encrypted AND operation for dm/le ∗ l bit. In the last step, the system needs to decrypt
dm/le integers to get the result. Before the computation, both the Alice and Bob need to
send their bloom filter to the server which is dm/le integers. After the computation has been
done, dm/le integers need to be sent back as the result.

5.3

Security Analysis

As the goal of our system is to provide secure and private protocols for users to share location
data without leaking sensitive information, we now analyze the security of this system in the
presence of semi-honest adversaries from the perspectives of Alice, Bob, and the server.
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5.3.1

Alice’s Privacy and Actions

Observe that in our protocol designs, as long as Alice correctly encrypts her data with the
public key, her security and privacy is well protected. Therefore, users will not be discouraged
from adopting this service and publishing their location data due to privacy concerns.
On the other hand, Alice is able to decrypt the results received from the aggregation
server only when there are intersections. In optimizations O1 and O3, Alice only gets random
integers unless it is zero, indicating that there exists an intersection. In optimization O2, we
introduced intentional randomness during the evaluation to prevent Alice from identifying
Bob’s position.

5.3.2

Bob’s Privacy and Actions

As discussed in Section 5.3.1, all of the optimizations O1 to O3 reveal no Bob’s location
data to Alice. Next, we consider whether Bob’s location data is leaked to the aggregation
server. In optimizations O2 and O3, Bob submits his query to the server in an encrypted
way, which guarantees the server has no access to Bob’s data. In optimization O1, the server
may only obtain Bob’s positions of the bits flipped as 1 but not his location data in plaintext.
Strong cryptographic but computationally intensive hash functions, such as password-based
key derivation functions, can make the server’s brute-force attacks on Bob’s location data
less effective.

5.3.3

The Aggregation Server’s Actions

We assume that the messages between Alice, Bob, and the server are encrypted, so the
communication channel can be secure. For optimization O1, the server’s potential bruteforce attack on Bob has been presented in Section 5.3.2. For optimizations O2 and O3, even
if the server is compromised and is able to read and write all messages, information is not
leaked to the server due to the very nature of the homomorphic encryption: all computations
are based on encrypted data, not plain text.
On the other hand, the server is indeed able to log the IP addresses and user accounts
of the users. But we consider this not a security problem as this is the standard operations
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of social networks and apps. Finally, the server may sabotage the system by refusing to
act as the intermediate server. In practice, this does not often happen as servers lack the
motivations to block users arbitrarily.

5.4

Evaluation

In this section, we report experimental results of our homomorphic bloom filter protocols
based on a real-world smartphone mobile dataset. First, we briefly describe the dataset and
the experimental setup. Then, the parameter settings of the protocols are presented. Finally,
we compare the computation and communication overhead of different protocols.

5.4.1

Datasets and Experimental Setup

Our dataset, provided by a telecommunication carrier in China, consists of thousands of
cellular data access records in a small city. More specifically, this dataset includes 7607
unique users, 121 cell towers, and was collected by from 6:00 pm to 9:00 pm on a Sunday in
2014. Each mobile data access record contains the coordinate of the cell tower with which the
user communicates. A sequence of records of a user can be viewed as her history trajectory.
We randomly pick users and generate queries for evaluation. All experiments are performed
on a PC with a 3.10GHz Xeon E3-1220 processor, and 32GB memory, running Red Hat
4.8.5.

5.4.2

Parameter Settings

We group the users in our dataset into 4 categories, by the number of unique towers they
visited: group 1 (1-15 points), group 2 (16-30 points), group 3 (31-45 points), group 4 (above
45 points). The default false positive probability is set as 0.1. According to Equation 5.4
and Equation 5.5, we use a 250-bit bloom filter with 4 hash function for group 1 & 2, a
500-bit bloom filter with 4 hash function for group 3 & 4.
We implement the optimization O1 and O2 on an integer encryption system (SEAL) [65],
and the optimization O3 on a binary encryption system based on [117]. In SEAL, we set
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polynomial modulus as “1xˆ1024+100 , coefficient modulus as F F F F F F F 00001 and plaintext
modulus as 256. Under this setting, we calculate the size of a freshly encrypted integer in
SEAL as 1025∗48∗2 = 98400 bits, where 1025 is the number of coefficients in one polynomial,
48 is the number of bits per coefficient occupies, and 2 is the size of the array of polynomials.
To minimize the difference of the size of the ciphertext, for the binary encryption system,
the security parameter λ is set as 4, and each bit in the plaintext is encrypted into a 1024-bit
wide ciphertext.

5.4.3

Computation Overhead

The computation overhead can be decomposed into three parts: the encryption time, the
query computation time and decryption time, where the encryption happens at both Alice
and Bob.

We randomly perform 20 queries for each group of users and compare the

computation overhead of all three optimizations in Figure 5.3.
As we can see, in optimization O1, the encryption overhead at Alice dominates the overall
computation overhead, as Alice requires to encrypt every bit in her bloom filter BFA . In
optimization O2, the encryption overhead at Alice is much larger than encryption overhead
at Bob, because the number of integers to be encrypted is determined by the number of
flipped 1s in the bloom filter. This also explains why the encryption overhead increases
as the number of location points increase. Since optimization O2 incurs large intermediate
results to be transmitted back to Alice, the decryption overhead (almost 5 seconds) is high.
The computation overhead of optimization O3 can reach 24 seconds in total (11 seconds for
encryption), which is the highest among all three protocols. We think it is mainly caused
by the setting of the security parameter λ in our evaluation. The binary homomorphic
encryption library we used requires λ to be set as a power of two. To keep the size of
ciphertext generated by this library and the SEAL on the same scale, the λ is set as 4 in our
experiments. If we minimize the λ to 2, both the computation overhead and the ciphertext
size decline exponentially.
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Figure 5.3: Computation overhead

5.4.4

Communication Overhead

The communication overhead mainly consists of three parts: the ciphertext submitted to the
server by Alice, the ciphertext submitted to the server by Bob, and the computation results
sent from the server to Alice. We use the size of the ciphertext to be transmitted as the
main measure for communication overhead. We compare the communication overhead of all
three optimizations in Figure 5.4.
As we can see that in optimization O1, most of the overhead happens at sending
ciphertext from Alice to the server, as each bit in the bloom filter is treated as an integer.
Thus, optimizations O2 and O3 beat optimization O1 regarding the communication overhead
generated by the data transmission from Alice to the server. For optimization O2, besides the
heavy communication overhead at transmitting ciphertext from Alice to the server, a large
number of encrypted intermediate results sent from the server to Alice also cause a high
communication overhead. Optimization O3, which adopts a bit-wise encryption scheme,
has the lowest communication overhead with only tens of KB in size. All three parts of
communication overhead for optimization O3 keep the equal, as the bloom filters of Alice
and Bob are always treated as integer arrays with the same size in the bit-wise computations.

5.4.5

Protocol Accuracy

As the bloom filter has possible false positives, we take the users in group 3 (31-45 points)
as an example to demonstrate the computation overhead in Figure 5.5 and communication
overhead in Figure 5.6 given different false positive possibility p. We set the corresponding
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number of hash functions k and the size of bloom filter m based on Equation 5.4 and
Equation 5.5.
For optimization O1, as the encryption at Alice and transmission of data from Alice to
server dominate the computation overhead and communication overhead respectively, they
both decrease as p increases, whereas other overheads are quite stable. For optimization
O2, both computation overhead and communication overhead decrease as p increases with
the exception that the encryption overhead at Bob keeps relatively stable.

Similar to

optimizations O1 and O2, optimization O3 also shows a trend of decreasing overhead as
p increases.
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Chapter 6
SenCAPTCHA: A Mobile-First
CAPTCHA Using Orientation Sensors
As most location-based services are operated on mobile devices, it is reasonable to imagine
bots mimic a mobile environment to attack remote location servers such as querying
locations constantly, or submitting fake locations. To mitigate these attacks, we propose
the SenCAPTCHA, a novel orientation sensor based CAPTCHA system designed for mobile
devices, to distinguish between humans and bots. SenCAPTCHA utilizes animal keypoint
detection as the hard problem to prevent bots, while humans could solve it by slightly
tilting their smartphones. Our usability studies demonstrate that compared to other existing
CAPTCHAs (audio-, image-, text-, and video-based), SenCAPTCHA has higher perceived
usability and faster completion times. Additionally, it is identified as the favorite CAPTCHA
by over half of our participants. Note that this chapter is based on my published paper:
Y. Feng, Q. Cao, H. Qi, and S. Ruoti. SenCAPTCHA: A Mobile-First CAPTCHA
Using Orientation Sensors. Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and
Ubiquitous Technologies (formerly known as UbiComp), 2020.

6.1

SenCAPTCHA

SenCAPTCHA is a mobile-first CAPTCHA scheme leveraging the orientation sensors
available on mobile devices to provide a CAPTCHA that works even on devices with
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Z
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Y
(a) SenCAPTCHA

(b) Orientation axes

Figure 6.1: The red moving ball is controlled by built-in orientation sensors (X and Y axes)
on mobile devices. Users tilt their devices to move the ball to target positions to pass the
SenCAPTCHA test.

constrained screen real estate (e.g., smartphones, smartwatches). In SenCAPTCHA, users
are shown a picture of an animal and are asked to tilt their phones to guide a red ball into
the center of that animal’s eye (see Figure 6.1). The design of SenCAPTCHA was guided
by three principles:
• Low effort. SenCAPTCHA requires no expert knowledge and is designed to be easily
solved by most users. Instead of relying on conventional I/O interface (e.g., keyboard,
mouse, touchscreen), SenCAPTCHA utilizes orientation sensors, offering a natural, novel,
and efficient user experience for mobile devices.
• Enjoyable. We model SenCAPTCHA after sensor-based games on mobile devices that
ask users to complete various tasks by rotating their phones. By adopting a more gamelike approach, we hope to reduce the burden of completing SenCAPTCHA (similar to
other puzzle-based CAPTCHAs).
• Clean UI. SenCAPTCHA avoids blurred visual elements, often found in text-based and
video-based CAPTCHAs, increasing its visual appeal and ease of use.
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(a) Rotate

(b) Zoom and Translate

(c) Tile

Figure 6.2: Image mutations to improve attack resilience

6.1.1

Resilience to Bots

To prevent bots from solving SenCAPTCHA, we take advantage of the fact that detecting
animal facial keypoints is a hard problem. One challenge for animal facial keypoint detection
is that, due to the high annotation and collecting cost for training, the amount of annotated
data of animals is too limited to effectively leverage Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs),
which have shown impressive performance on human faces. For example, the AFLW [63]
dataset consists of 25,993 human faces, while the horse and sheep datasets from previous
work [92, 125] only have 3,717 and 600 images, respectively. Furthermore, even if a CNN
could be trained, it would need to be specific to each animal species requiring another
classifier to first identify the animal. Another challenge is that animal images generally have
more diverse backgrounds—for example, they are often taken in environments where the
animal somewhat blends into the background.
To further improve SenCAPTCHA’s resilience to attacks, we randomly rotate, zoom and
translate, or tile the animal picture as shown in Figure 6.2. This makes keypoint detection
harder by changing the shape of the animal, modifying facial features, or partially obscuring
the face preventing the creation of an accurate bounding box [125, 92], even though labeled
datasets are available for training models. For example, we observed the average failure rate
across keypoints of a deep learning model proposed in [92] increased from 8.36% to over 90%
when image mutations were applied on a large dataset containing 3717 horse images. We
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measured the security and usability impact of these changes, and this is discussed later in
the paper (see Section 6.2 and Section 6.3 respectively).

6.1.2

System Overview

SenCAPTCHA works in a client-server model and is broken up into two components. A
server-side component provides the background image and determines when the CAPTCHA
is solved. A HTML5/JavaScript-based client-side component displays the CAPTCHA to the
user and records the ball’s movement to send to the server for verification. Importantly in
this separation of duties, the client-side portion never learns the location of the eye, as the
client-side component runs inside the attacker’s environment.
As shown in Figure 6.3, the workflow of SenCAPTCHA can be broken up into three
primary phases: (1) SenCAPTCHA is initialized; (2) the user tilts their devices to move the
ball into the animal’s eye; and (3) the ball’s trajectory is analyzed to distinguish between
authentication human users and bots. Most operations are performed on the server with
only the UI-rendering and sensor-reading handled by the client.
Initialization
During the initialization phase, the server needs to create a puzzle image, determine how
close the ball must get to the target, select a starting position for the ball, and send this
information to the client.
Creating Puzzle Image To create the puzzle image, the server first selects an image from
its image corpus. This corpus contains a set of images along with their respective keypoints.
It then mutates the chosen image using one of the following three techniques (see Figure 6.2):
• Rotate. The image is rotated by a random angle. The image is then scaled such that
no white-space is shown to the user. If the eye falls outside the area shown to the user
or is too close to the edge, then another randomly selected rotation angle is chosen.
• Zoom and translate. A random horizontal scaling factor and a separate random
vertical scaling factor are used. After scaling the image, it is translated to ensure that
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Figure 6.3: SenCAPTCHA’s workflow
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the eye is visible to users (within the area shown to users) and is not too close to image
edges.
• Tile. The image is broken into several tiles (currently fixed at 9 [3x3], though it could
also be randomly selected), then those tiles are randomly arranged and displayed to the
user. As with other methods, if the eye is too close to image edges, it will be moved to
another random location.
As part of this mutation, the server will also calculate the new location of the image’s
keypoint. Note that each mutation can take a single image from the image corpus and
generate many unique puzzles. For example, the tile mutation takes a single image, breaks
it into nine tiles, and then randomly orders those tiles, producing one of 9! = 362, 880
different puzzles. This process ensures that even with a small corpus of images, we can
generate a massive number of puzzles for SenCAPTCHA’s use.
Calculate Target Distance Next, the server calculates how close the center of the ball
must be to the center of the puzzle’s keypoint for the puzzle to be solved. This distance (d)
is measured in and is calculated based on a server-side tolerance value that indicates how
close the two centers must be as a percentage of the overall image size. Note that there is an
inverse relationship between tolerance and the difficulty of solving the puzzle. The formula
for calculating d from tolerance is given in Equation 6.1.

d = tolerance ∗

width + height
2

(6.1)

The radius of the ball is made equal to distance d to ensure that if the user sees the ball
touch the keypoint, the puzzle will also be solved. We do impose a minimum radius of 5
pixels for the ball to ensure that it is visible on small form factors with limited resolution.
Select Starting Position The ball the user needs to move starts at a random position.
This position is picked by selecting one option from each of the following sets and combining
them: {top, middle, bottom} and {left, center, right}.
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Send Information to the Client The server-side component sends the client-side
component the following data: (1) the mutated image, (2) the ball’s starting location, and
(3) the ball’s radius. The client-side code will then handle rendering the image to a HTML
Canvas element. The ball is also rendered to this element at the indicated starting point
with the given radius. The ball itself is colored red, with a solid black outline.
Moving the Ball
To move the ball, users tilt their devices.1 To track the device’s tilt, we use the azimuth-pitchroll convention to represent the mobile device’s orientation angles, as shown in Figure 6.1(b).
Among the three angles, only the pitch angle (degrees of the rotation about the X axis) and
the roll angle (degrees of the rotation about the Y axis) are used to compute the ball’s
position, since the azimuth angle denotes a compass-like direction value and contributes
nothing to the ball’s movement. The pitch angle β and roll angle γ change when tilting
mobile devices upwards/downwards and rotating mobile devices around their left/right
edges respectively. β reports values between −180°and 180°, while γ reports values between
−90°and 90°.
To access the current pitch angle β and roll angle γ through mobile browsers, the clientside component listens to the deviceOrientation event, which reports fresh orientation
sensor readings whenever the device is rotated (i.e., tilted). Each time this event is fired,
we calculate the δ between the previous rotation and the current rotation and use this to
move the ball. If the rotation crosses an axis (e.g., goes from 79°to −79°), we catch these
large changes and transition them to the small change they actually represent (e.g., 2°).
The actual distance the ball moves is controlled by a ball speed parameter set by the server
(currently, this is

1
30

of the image for each degree of rotation). The movement of the ball

itself is constrained to the boundaries of the image.
Each time the ball moves by at least a single pixel (modern devices are sensitive to
record many sub-pixel moves), the new location is sent the server which checks whether the
CAPTCHA has been completed—i.e., whether the distance between the center of the ball
and the center of the keypoint is less than d pixels. If the two are within d pixels, the puzzle
1

SenCAPTCHA also supports moving the ball using touch or the mouse, but this is disabled by default.
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is solved, and the client is notified of the puzzle’s completion. Note that users do not need to
hover over the keypoint or click a button to finish the puzzle. Instead, they are just required
to move the ball within the appropriate distance of the keypoint. In Section 6.7.3 we discuss
other potential options for puzzle completion. If users fail to complete the CAPTCHA within
a time limit (e.g., 1 minute), they are considered to have failed the CAPTCHA.
Trajectory Analysis
After the ball has been moved into the center of the animal’s eye, the server will check the
history of ball locations (i.e., trajectory) to determine if the CAPTCHA was completed by
humans or by bots. When completing SenCAPTCHA, we expect that humans will move the
ball directly towards the animal’s eye. In contrast, the design of SenCAPTCHA makes it
difficult for bots to determine the eye’s location with high confidence, therefore they will need
to employ heuristic search strategies to find the eye from a set of possible locations. As such,
it becomes possible to distinguish between human- and bot-based completion by comparing
how closely the ball’s recorded trajectory matches the optimal trajectory (a straight line from
the starting location to the animal’s eye). This comparison is made using a Dynamic Time
Warping (DTW) algorithm [96, 91], with the attempt being considered human-generated if
the calculated warping distance is below a given threshold.2
To confirm that human trajectories resemble the ideal trajectory, we completed hundreds
of SenCAPTCHA puzzles within our research group and recorded those trajectories. As
shown in Figure 6.4, while these trajectories do show deviation from the optimal path, they
generally stay close to that path. This is different from bot-based approaches, which will
have to use various search heuristics to find the eye. These results were further confirmed
by the results from our user study (see Section 6.3).
To further differentiate between humans and bots, it may be possible to train a machine
learning algorithm on the user’s trajectory and see if it looks human-like and resembles past
attempts from the user (similar to what NoCAPTCHA does with user mouse movement).
Such approaches could help detect bots even if they get lucky and correctly detect where the
2

Thresholds for our DTW-based classification are based on both the behaviors of bots (see Section 6.2)
and empirical data gathered from our first user study (see Section 6.3).
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(a) Top to bottom

(b) Bottom to Top

(c) Left to right

(d) Right to left

Figure 6.4: Example human-generated trajectories
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eye is. Still, we note that it is likely that an advanced adversary could trick the trajectory
analysis if it knew the location of the image’s keypoint. As such, it is important to remember
that SenCAPTCHA’s security is primarily based on the difficulty of finding the keypoint.

6.2

Security Analysis

In this section, we analyze possible attack approaches on SenCAPTCHA. We categorize
possible attacks into brute-force attacks and machine learning based attacks. Specifically,
brute-force attacks check every possible position for the eye until the correct position is
found. Machine learning based attacks take advantage of visual recognition techniques to
identify the eye’s position automatically.

6.2.1

Brute-force Attacks

The most intuitive brute-force attack is random guessing, which checks arbitrary locations
one by one until reaching the target point. For each pair of the starting and ending point, we
can estimate its distribution of random guessing DTW distances through sampling. Recall
that SenCAPTCHA allows the ball launching from one position of the four corners, the four
middle points at the edge, and the canvas center. Considering the symmetries of the canvas,
we only need to study three representative starting locations: corner, middle point at edge,
and center. Suppose the canvas size is 100 by 100, and the ball starts from the corner. Then
we randomly select (x, y) as the target point, where both x and y are integers. Thus, we
have 9,999 target points since the start location cannot be the target point at the same time.
For each (x, y) pair, we run the random guessing method 1000 times, generating 1000
trajectories randomly.

We then calculate all DTW distances between each simulated

trajectory and the optimal path, i.e., the straight line connecting the start location and the
target location (x, y). Next, we use the normal distribution f (d|µ, σ 2 ) to fit the probability
density of DTW distances, where d represents the DTW distance, µ denotes the mean of
DTW distances, and σ is the standard deviation. The cumulative distribution function of
f (d|µ, σ 2 ) is denoted by F (d). If we take the µ − 2.5σ as the threshold to distinguish humans
from bots (i.e., if the DTW distance is larger than the threshold, it is classified as bots), the
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(a) Corner

(b) Mid edge

(c) Center

Figure 6.5: Values of µ − 2.5σ for random guessing attacks

successful attack rate will be F (µ − 2.5σ), which is less than 0.63%. Thus, for all the 9,999
target points with a starting location from the corner, we plot their µ−2.5σ in Figure 6.5(a).
Similarly, we simulate and calculate the µ − 2.5σ for starting location from the middle point
of edges and the center, as shown in Figure 6.5(b) and 6.5(c) respectively. Base on the
µ − 2.5σ values in Figure 6.5, a DTW threshold of 25 will be safe to distinguish bots from
humans. We also checked 2385 trajectories by participants in Section 6.3 and found 93%
responses were classified correctly.

6.2.2

Machine Learning Based Attacks

In this subsection, we deployed three machine learning based attacks, namely Scale-Invariant
Feature Transform (SIFT) model [76], Triplet Interpolated Feature (TIF) model [125], and
Interspecies Knowledge Transfer (IKT) model [92], to localize the animal facial keypoints on
mutated images that are used in SenCAPTCHA.
Datasets and Evaluation Metric. In the TIF [125] and IKT papers [92], the authors
published 50 labeled sheep images and 3717 labeled horse images respectively. Each sheep
image contained a face bounding box and eight labeled keypoints, i.e., Left Outer Ear (LOE),
Left Inner Ear (LIE), Right Outer Ear (ROE), Right Inner Ear (RIE), Left Eye (LE), Right
Eye (RE), Nose (N), and Mouth (M). Each horse image was labeled five keypoints, i.e., Left
Eye (LE), Right Eye (RE), Nose (N), Left Mouth Edge (LM), and Right Mouth Edge (RE).
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We observed the released horse images had been cropped accordingly, and used the rectangle
composed by four image edges as the bounding box. When measuring the detection success
rate, we followed the same metric used in [125, 92]: If the Euclidean distance between the
detected keypoint and its corresponding ground-truth keypoint was less than 10% of the face
bounding box size, it was regarded as a success. We evaluated SIFT on both datasets, TIF
on the sheep dataset, and IKT on the horse dataset.
SIFT Attacks. As SIFT is robust to uniform scaling, orientation, and illumination
changes [76], it has been widely used for object recognition. We applied SIFT on both the
sheep and horse datasets to detect facial keypoints. For each dataset, we calculated the
average detection success rate for three types of mutated (zoomed, rotated, and tile) images,
Considering the relatively small size of the sheep dataset, we generated ten zoomed and
tile images randomly for each sheep image to expand the dataset. Note that we did not
perform data augmentation on rotated images because SIFT is invariant to orientation. The
average detection success rates of SIFT on the sheep and horse datasets are illustrated in
Table 6.1(a) and Table 6.1(c) respectively. All success rates for any facial keypoints on the
two datasets are below 10%. The lowest average success rates for all eight sheep keypoints
and five horse keypoints are lower than 7.3% and 3.6% respectively (see the last columns in
Table 6.1(a) and Table 6.1(c).) These low success rates indicate SenCAPTCHA is able to
resist SIFT-based attacks with a high probability.
TIF Attacks. The TIF method extracts triplet interpolation features and calculates a
shape-indexed feature using three anchor landmarks [125]. TIF is sensitive to the given face
bounding box when identifying keypoints and it will not work effectively if we intentionally
crop partial animal faces due to the incorrectly computed bounding box, as shown in
Figure 6.6(b). When an image is rotated or tiled randomly, TIF fails to detect facial keypoints
as well. Examples are shown in Figures 6.6(a) and 6.6(c).
Similar to data augmentation adopted in SIFT attack analysis, we generated ten
randomly zoomed, rotated, and tile images for each sheep image to increase the diversity
of data. Table 6.1(b) illustrates keypoint detection success rates (% of predicted keypoints
whose Euclidean distance to the corresponding ground-truth keypoint is less than 10% of
the face bounding box size) regarding eight different facial keypoints on three types of image
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Table 6.1: Success rates for SIFT-, TIF-, and IKT-based animal keypoint detection
(a) SIFT-based detection on the sheep dataset

Zoom
Rotate
Tile

LOE
0.8%
0.7%
3.3%

LIE
5.5%
1.1%
4.9%

LE
8.6%
1.0%
4.2%

RE
9.6%
1.3%
4.7%

RIE
5.8%
1.2%
4.4%

ROE
3.0%
0.8%
3.2%

N
6.6%
1.4%
5.3%

M
5.6%
1.2%
4.9%

ALL
7.3%
1.1%
4.4%

M
4.2%
0.0%
10.4%

ALL
4.6%
0.0%
13.1%

(b) TIF-based detection on the sheep dataset

Zoom
Rotate
Tile

LOE
1.0%
0.0%
15.2%

LIE
6.0%
0.0%
16.6%

LE
6.8%
0.0%
14.4%

RE
6.6%
0.0%
12.6%

RIE
4.4%
0.0%
14.0%

ROE
1.0%
0.0%
12.6%

N
7.0%
0.2%
9.2%

(c) SIFT-based detection on the horse dataset

Zoom
Rotate
Tile

LE
3.6%
3.8%
3.1%

RE
3.0%
3.6%
3.0%

N
2.8%
3.8%
3.3%

LM
2.6%
3.5%
3.1%

RM
2.9%
3.3%
3.4%

ALL
3.1%
3.6%
3.2%

(d) IKT-based detection on the horse dataset

Zoom
Rotate
Tile

LE
9.4%
2.2%
2.8%

RE
6.1%
2.1%
2.6%

N
11.6%
0.5%
3.4%
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LM
10.0%
1.4%
4.2%

RM
11.5%
2.0%
4.0%

ALL
9.2%
1.5%
3.4%

(a) Rotation

Figure 6.6: TIF attacks.

(b) Zoom

(eye),
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(c) Tile

(nose),

(ear),

(mouth)

mutations. The average success rates on both zoomed and rotated images are below 5%.
Although the average success rate of tiles is above 10%, the tolerance in SenCAPTCHA
(ranging from 2% to 3% of the bounding box size) is much smaller than the failure detection
threshold—i.e., 10% of the bounding box size. This implies that the true success rate when
using a TIF-based attack against SenCAPTCHA would be lower than 10% in practice.
IKT Attacks. As a deep transfer learning model, IKT achieves state-of-the-art animal
facial keypoint detection performance by warping the animal face shape to make them more
human-like, and then adapting the pre-trained human keypoint detector [92]. However, due
to the assumption of the known face bounding boxes, IKT cannot deal with the animal
images with partial faces, as shown in Figure 6.7(b). In addition, Figures 6.7(a) and 6.7(c)
show that IKT’s performance is affected dramatically by rotations and misplaced keypoints.
For each image mutation, we first applied it on the horse dataset, and then trained a
new IKT model from scratch. We used the same testing images that were used in the IKT
paper [92] for evaluation. Note that the testing images were not unseen by our trained
IKT models, although it might improve the detection accuracy. Table 6.1(d) summarizes
the success rates regarding five different facial keypoints for three types of image mutations.
It is interesting to note that the average success rate on zoomed images is 9.2%, which is
much higher than that of rotated images (1.5%) and tiling (3.4%). This high success rate
on zoomed images implies one limitation of IKT: in order to identify the angle of interest
needed to build a mapping to human faces, IKT requires at least three keypoints existing
within the bounding box, which indicates the impossibility of training IKT on images with
less than three keypoints.

6.3

First Usability Study—Methodology

We conducted an IRB-approved, Amazon Mechanical Turk-administered usability study of
SenCAPTCHA. In this study, we measured overall impressions regarding SenCAPTCHA
as well as how various parameters affect SenCAPTCHA’s perceived usability and time to
complete: four image manipulations, three puzzle tolerances, and nine starting positions.
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(a) Rotation

(b) Zoom

Figure 6.7: IKT attacks.

(eye),

(c) Tile

(nose),

(mouth)

The study ran over the course of five hours on October 9th, 2019. In total, 308 participants
completed our usability study, with data from 270 of them used in our analysis.

6.3.1

Study Setup

Participants took 1–15 minutes to complete the study, with an average time of 3 minutes.
Participants were paid $1.25 USD for their participation.

Before beginning the study,

participants read an IRB-approved consent statement that informed them that they would
need to use a mobile phone or tablet to complete the study. The survey itself also checked
whether participants were using a mobile phone or tablet and would not let them complete
the study if they were not.
After consenting to be a part of the study, participants were then asked a set of simple
demographic questions (gender and age). They were also asked how often they check their
mobile phones. The survey software also automatically gathered information about the user’s
mobile device (e.g., OS version, browser version, screen resolution).
After providing this information, users were told that they would complete a series of
where they “will be shown a picture of an animal and will tilt your phone to move a red ball
into the middle of the animal’s eye.” On the page with these instructions, they were given a
chance to practice moving a ball around an image. When they were ready to continue, they
could click the next button.
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At this point, participants were randomly assigned two different treatments:
1. Image mutation: no mutation, rotation, zoom and translate, or tile.
2. Puzzle tolerance: 0.02, 0.025, 0.03
Participants then completed nine SenCAPTCHA puzzles. The base image used in each
puzzle was randomized, but we ensured that participants were never shown the same image
more than once in the study. Each of the nine images used a different starting position for
the ball, with the order of these starting images randomized. For the image mutations, all
parameters were randomized each time (see Section 6.1).
Participants were given one minute to solve each CAPTCHA. If they did not solve
the CAPTCHA within that minute, they were shown a message (using JavaScript’s alert
function) telling them that the puzzle had timed out. When the click “OK” to this message,
the next puzzle was automatically started. The time it took participants to complete the
CAPTCHA was recorded along with the trajectory used to complete the CAPTCHAs was
recorded for each puzzle, including whether the user timed out.
After completing the nine puzzles, participants were told that the puzzle they just
completed was intended to be used as a CAPTCHA. This was done so that users
could contextualize their answers in the remainder of the study, because feedback for
SenCAPTCHA as a fun puzzle is likely to be very different than feedback for SenCAPTCHA
as a CAPTCHA. After being informed of SenCAPTCHA’s intended use, participants were
asked to complete the ten questions from the System Usability Scale (SUS) [15, 14]. We
chose to use the SUS scale for several reasons. First, SUS has been shown to be a good
indicator of perceived usability [115], is consistent across studies [95], as has reported norms
that we can compare our results against [98].
Finally, participants were asked if they had any other feedback regarding SenCAPTCHA.
After completing the survey, participants received a code that they would input into the
Amazon MTurk site to get paid.
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6.3.2

Data Cleanup

In total, 308 participants completed the survey, but several were unable to get SenCAPTCHA
working. Of the participants, 266 completed every puzzle, 2 participants completed all
but one puzzles, 2 completed all but two puzzles. The remaining 38 participants failed to
complete any puzzles. Based on feedback from these 38 participants, we learned that in many
cases SenCAPTCHA would simply not run on their devices. There was a variety of reasons
for this: (a) in Safari on iOS 13, by default websites are not allowed to use sensor data, (b)
some distributions of Android do not report screen orientation events to the browser if screen
rotation has been locked, (c) and other distributions always refuse to provide sensor data
to the browser (likely tied to a distribution-specific setting). As we were using this study
to evaluated SenCAPTCHA, we remove data from the 38 participants who were unable to
ever use SenCAPTCHA, but did include the data from participants where there was only
a problem once or twice, leaving us with 270 participants for which we report results. For
those 270 participants, we reported all available data, though for the four participants that
had trouble completing SenCAPTCHA at least once, we only included the completion times
for the puzzles where SenCAPTCHA worked for them.

6.3.3

Qualitative Analysis

To analyze the qualitative feedback provided by users, we used an open coding approach
based on the constant-comparative method [39].

Two coders together reviewed every

response, assigning one or more codes to describe the sentiment expressed in the response.
Codes were only assigned if both reviewers agreed on the assignment. At the end of the
coding process, the coders made a second pass over the data to merge related codes and
ensure consistent usage across the data set. They also selected representative quotes to be
used to help describe each code.

6.3.4

Demographics

Participants in our study were pulled from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Other than the
restriction that participants must complete the study with a smartphone or tablet, there
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were no other limitations on who could participate in the study. Demographics from our
study are given in Table 6.2.

6.3.5

Limitations

While we informed participants that SenCAPTCHA was intended to be used as a
CAPTCHA, we did not actually have users test it in this capacity. As such, the results might
not fully reflect SenCAPTCHA’s true usability. While such a measurement was sufficient
for our intended purposes, future work could try SenCAPTCHA in-situ to see if reactions
change.

6.4

First Usability Study—Results

In this section, we report on the System Usability Scale (SUS) scores for SenCAPTCHA,
the time taken to complete SenCAPTCHA puzzles, and qualitative feedback. Quantitative
results are summarized in Table 6.3. We use a one-way ANOVA as our omnibus test
with Tukey’s as our post-hoc pairwise statistical test. Where appropriate, we have used
a Bonferroni correction to adjust for family-wise error in our statistical tests.

6.4.1

System Usability Scale

The differences between mutations (F (3, 266) = 0.52, p = 1.0) and tolerances (F (2, 267) =
0.27, p = 1.0) were not statistically significant. SUS scores from India are lower than scores
from other countries (omnibus—F (2, 267) = 96.03, p < 0.001, India vs. USA—p < 0.001,
India vs. Other—p < 0.001, USA vs. Other—p = 0.87). We initially hypothesized that
this might be due to individuals in India having older devices but found no support for
this in our data. Also, there is a statistically significant difference for SUS scores based on
age (F (4, 265) = 10.47, p < 0.001), with users 18–34 giving lower scores than users 35–64
(all pairwise tests within these groups are not statistically significant). Finally, there is a
statistically significant difference for scores based on mobile phone usage (F (5, 264) = 3.38,
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Table 6.2: Demographics for first usability study
Category
Gender

Age

Mobile
Phone
Usage

Country

Demographic
Male
Female
Prefer not to say
18–24
25–34
35-44
45–54
55–64
Prefer not to say
65 years or older
Constantly
6–15 times an hour
3–5 times an hour
1–2 times an hour
Less than once an hour
Prefer not to say
India
USA
Other
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Count
170
100
0
55
145
50
12
8
0
0
31
32
71
86
47
3
139
122
9

%
63.0%
37.0%
0.0%
20.4%
53.7%
18.5%
4.4%
3.0%
0.0%
0.0%
11.5%
11.9%
26.3%
31.9%
17.4%
1.1%
51.5%
45.2%
3.3%

Table 6.3: Quantitative results from the first usability study
Mean
Category
Overall
Mutation

Tolerance

Age

Mobile
Phone
Usage

Country

Value
None
Rotate
Zoom
Tile
0.02
0.025
0.03
18–24
25–34
35-44
45–54
55–64
Constantly
6–15 times an hour
3–5 times an hour
1–2 times an hour
Less than once an hour
Prefer not to say
India
USA
Other

Count
270
70
68
70
62
92
105
73
55
145
50
12
8
31
32
71
86
47
3
139
122
9
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66
67
64
66
64
65
67
64
58
63
79
81
87
71
73
61
66
63
42
53
78
81

Mdn
SUS
61
63
59
61
60
60
63
58
58
58
74
81
89
65
75
53
63
58
40
50
84
90

SD
19
20
18
20
19
19
20
18
19
19
18
15
8
19
19
20
18
19
8
11
18
17

Mean
Time
4.7
4.6
4.9
4.6
4.8
5.5
4.1
4.5
4.2
5.0
4.2
4.3
5.8
3.6
3.9
4.4
5.2
5.1
11.5
5.2
5.6
4.1

Mdn SD
(seconds)
3.7 3.5
3.4 3.1
3.5 5.0
3.9 2.5
4.0 2.7
4.1 4.8
3.5 2.2
3.5 2.7
3.4 3.7
3.8 3.9
3.7 1.0
4.2 1.5
4.7 3.3
3.3 1.6
3.5 2.4
3.5 2.8
4.0 3.5
4.0 5.0
11.2 2.3
4.0 3.9
3.6 7.8
3.5 2.2

p = 0.03), though post-hoc testing finds only a single statistically significant difference
between “6–15 times and hour” and “3–5 times an hour” (p = 0.04).
Comparing our SUS results to norms reported by Sauro and Lewis [98], we see that the
SUS score for SenCAPTCHA falls in line with the mean norm reported Sauro and Lewis.
This is encouraging as we would expect CAPTCHAs to be annoying and fall below the mean
norm. Additionally, we note that for older participants and participants not from India, the
average SUS scores are much higher and fall between the 90th and 97th percentile for SUS
scores, a truly great achievement.

6.4.2

Time to Complete

The only statistically significant difference in completion time is for mobile phone usage
(F (5, 264) = 4.03, p < 0.01), inasmuch as users who “Prefer not to say” are slower than all
other groups (all pairwise tests with “Prefer not to say” are statistically significant, no others
are). The differences between mutations (F (3, 266) = 0.12, p = 1.0), tolerances (F (2, 267) =
4.302, p = 0.07), ages (F (4, 265) = 1.12, p = 1.0), and countries (F (4, 265) = 3.55, p = 0.15)
are not statistically significant.

6.4.3

Qualitative Feedback

Just under two-thirds of participants left some feedback in the optional feedback field,
though around half of this feedback was about the survey—i.e., generic comments about
it being a good survey. In general, participants had positive perceptions of SenCAPTCHA:
17 (6.3%) participants indicated that it was enjoyable, 11 (4.1%) that it was easy, 8 (3.0%)
that it was interesting, and 58 (21.5%) with another generic positive responses. 5 (1.9%)
participants explicitly stated that it was better than other CAPTCHA systems. For example,
one participant stated,
“This would be SO much better compared to the traditional captchas. I love it,
seriously whoever came up with, this great job I really hope it is integrated on
sites very soon. I would love to see traditional ones be completely replaced by
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this. It’s much less annoying, and it seems a lot more consistent. Thank you for
letting me be a part of this.”
There were very few negative comments. 5 (1.9%) participants had a generic comment
about not liking SenCAPTCHA and 8 (3.0%) participants worried that SenCAPTCHA might
not work in some situations: for users with accessibility needs—2 (0.7%) participants, on
older phones—1 (0.4%) participant, if screen rotation was locked—1 (0.4%) participant, the
sensor might fail—1 (0.4%) participant, and unspecified worry—3 (1.1%) participants. For
example, one participant said,
“I found this easy to use but I could see some people, especially older people,
having a hard time with it.”
5 (1.9%) participants also mentioned needing to change their iOS settings to get
SenCAPTCHA working, which helped us track down and fix it in our second user study.

6.5

Second Usability Study—Methodology

In our first study, we found that users generally had positive attitudes towards
SenCAPTCHA and that they completed the CAPTCHAs very quickly. To understand how
SenCAPTCHA’s performance compares to other existing CAPTCHA schemes, we conducted
an IRB-approved, Amazon Mechanical Turk-administered, within-subject usability study
test of five different CAPTCHA systems. The study ran over the course of seven hours on
November 12th, 2019. In total, 202 participants completed our second usability study.
The five systems we tested are,
• SenCAPTCHA. Based on our security evaluation, we used the rotation and tile image
mutations. Based on our first usability study, we set the difficulty parameter to 0.25.
• Text-based. We used Securimage [89], an open-source free PHP CAPTCHA script, to
generate text-based CAPTCHA challenges. To complete the CAPTCHA, users had to
enter the two words displayed. These words were pulled from a dictionary consisting
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of 1,488 common six-letter English words. They were also slightly distorted with added
background noise.
• Audio-based.

We again used Secureimage to generate audio-based CAPTCHA

challenges. To complete the CAPTCHA, users had to enter six random alphanumeric
characters that were read aloud. The audio sample had background noise inserted.
• Image-based. We implemented an image-based CAPTCHA that displays 16 images to
users in a four-by-four gird and asks them to select images matching some noun (e.g.,
horses, dogs). Each CAPTCHA contains three to six different types of images, with the
number of target images ranging from one to five. Images were pulled from the CIFAR-10
dataset and filtered to select the clearest images.
• Video-based CAPTCHA: We implemented a video-based CAPTCHA that displayed
five capital letters moving across the image from left to right. The letters loop around
every 2.7 seconds and rotate independently within a range of 30 degrees.
In each case, we implemented the non-SenCAPTCHA systems to be of comparable
difficulty (i.e., same level of distortion or obfuscation) to what we have observed online.
In each case, we also erred on the side of making these CAPTCHAs easier to provide a
fair comparison to SenCAPTCHA. For consistency, we had all the systems allow users to
refresh the CAPTCHA and get a new challenge. We also standardized the user interface
for each CAPTCHA to be as similar as possible. If users gave an incorrect answer for the
CAPTCHA, they were informed of the mistake and a new challenge was generated for them.

6.5.1

Study Setup

Participants took 3–27 minutes to complete the study, with an average time of 9.5 minutes.
Participants were paid $1.25 for their participation. Before beginning the study, participants
read an IRB-approved consent statement, which informed that they would need to use
a mobile phone or tablet to complete the study. The survey itself also checked whether
participants were using a mobile phone or tablet and would not let them complete the study
if they were not.
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After providing this information, participants completed tasks for each of the five different
types of CAPTCHAs (order of the different types was randomized). For each type of
CAPTCHA, participants completed three consecutive CAPTCHA instances, with the option
to skip a given instance if it took them more than one minute to complete. After completing
all three instances, participants provided feedback on their experience using the AfterScenario Questionnaire (ASQ) [67], which consists of three questions answered using a sevenpoint Likert scale:
Q1: Overall, I am satisfied with the ease of completing this type of CAPTCHA
Q2: Overall, I am satisfied with the amount of time it took to complete this type of CAPTCHA
Q3: Overall, I am satisfied with the support information (online help, messages,
documentation) when completing this type of CAPTCHA
After completing all five types of CAPTCHAs, participants were asked to indicate which
of the five was their favorite and why it was their favorite. They were also asked to indicate
which of the five, if any, they wouldn’t want to use in practice and why they wouldn’t want to
use them. For each of these questions, the ordering of the systems was randomized. Finally,
they were given a chance to provide any additional feedback they might want to give.

6.5.2

Data Cleanup

In total, 202 participants completed the study, though for 36 participants the sensor API
failed to initialize leaving them unable to use SenCAPTCHA. As with our first usability
study, we are unsure of what causes this, though it looks like it might be related to
device-specific limitations on the use of the orientation sensor by websites.3 For those 36
participants, we do not report their SenCAPTCHA ASQ scores or timing data nor use this
data in statistical (repeated-measure) tests as these participants didn’t use SenCAPTCHA
and as such can’t compare it to other CAPTCHA systems. We also do not report on
their favorite system or most disliked systems, as the purpose of these questions was to
3

For example, iOS 13.1 disallows the use of the orientation sensor by websites unless this is changed in
the device’s settings. iOS 13.2 added an API to request that permission programmatic (which we do).
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compare performance against SenCAPTCHA. We do report their ASQ scores and timing
for the other CAPTCHAs, as we believe these data points are unaffected by the problems
with SenCAPTCHA and can serve as meaningful norms to be compared against by future
CAPTCHA research.

6.5.3

Qualitative Analysis

To analyze the qualitative feedback provided by users, we used the same open coding
approach based on the constant-comparative method [39] as for the first user study.

6.5.4

Demographics

Participants in our study were pulled from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Other than the
restriction that participants must complete the study with a smartphone or tablet, there
were no other limitations on who could participate in the study. Demographics from our
study are given in Table 6.4.

6.6

Second Usability Study—Results

In this section, we report on After-Scenario Questionnaire (ASQ) scores, time taken to
complete each system, participants’ favorite and most disliked systems, and qualitative
feedback. Results are summarized in Figure 6.8. We used a one-way, repeated measures
ANOVA as our omnibus test (except where noted) with Tukey’s as our post-hoc pairwise
statistical test. For brevity, we only report on the significance of these pairwise tests, not
their individual p-values.

6.6.1

After-Scenario Questionnaire (ASQ)

SenCAPTCHA receives the highest rating of any of the CAPTCHA systems (16.14),
with audio-based CAPTCHAs receiving the lowest score (9.58). There was a statistically
significant omnibus effect for ASQ scores (two-way, repeated measures ANOVA—
F (4, 2907) = 123.61, p < 0.001), with all pairwise tests between SenCAPTCHA and
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Table 6.4: Demographics for second usability study
Category
Gender

Age

Mobile
Phone
Usage

Country

Demographic
Male
Female
Prefer not to say
18–24
25–34
35–44
45–54
55–64
Prefer not to say
65 years or older
Constantly
6–15 times an hour
3–5 times an hour
1–2 times an hour
Less than once an hour
Prefer not to say
India
USA
Other

107

Count
127
74
1
16
132
37
11
3
1
2
28
31
61
57
25
0
73
117
12

%
62.9%
36.6%
0.5%
7.9%
65.3%
18.3%
5.4%
1.5%
0.5%
1.0%
13.9%
15.3%
30.2%
28.2%
12.4%
0.0%
36.1%
57.9%
5.9%

Q1

Q2

Q3

(a) Mean ASQ score
Median = 47.07

Median = 5.02

Median = 9.60

Median = 10.08

Median = 11.93

(b) Mean completion time

3
98
27
10
28
0

20

40

audio

60

sencaptcha

80

image

video

100

text

(c) Favorite system
121
27
25
35
24
12
0

20

audio

40

sencaptcha

60

image

80

video

100

text

120

none

(d) Most disliked system

Figure 6.8: Quantitative results from the second usability study
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other CAPTCHAs being statistically significant. All pairwise tests between Audio and
other CAPTCHAs were also statistically significant. None of the other pairwise tests were
statistically significant.

6.6.2

Time to Complete

SenCAPTCHA had the lowest average completion time (5.02 seconds), while audio had
the longest average completion time (47.07 seconds). The remaining systems had similar
average completion times (around 10 seconds). These differences were statistically significant
(F (4, 198) = 288, p < 0.01), with all but two pairwise tests (SenCAPTCHA vs. video-based
and image-based vs. video-based) being statistically significant.

6.6.3

Favorite System

Of the 166 participants that used all five CAPTCHAs, 98 (59.0%) indicated that
SenCAPTCHA was their favorite system. This significantly outperformed the other four
CAPTCHAs: text-based—28 (16.9%) participants, image-based—27 (16.3%) participants,
video-based—10 (6.0%) participants, audio-based—3 (1.8%) participants. This difference
was statistically significant (χ2 test—χ2 = 134, p < 0.001)
Participants strongly disliked the audio-based CAPTCHAs, with 121 (72.9%) expressing
this sentiment. Participants’ dislikes in regard to other CAPTCHAs were evenly split: videobased—35 (21.1%) participants, SenCAPTCHA—27 (16.3%) participants, image-based—25
(15.1%) participants, text-based—24 (14.5%) participants. 12 (7.2%) participants indicated
that they did not dislike any of the CAPTCHA systems. These differences were statistically
significant (χ2 test—χ2 = 197, p < 0.001), with audio being the only pairwise statistically
significant difference (p < 0.001).

6.6.4

Refreshes, Failures, and Skips

Participants rarely refreshed the provided CAPTCHAs (means: 0.00–0.08 refreshes/attempt,
median: 0). Failures were a little more common, though still uncommon for CAPTCHAs
other than audio-based (mean failures/attempt:
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audio—1.66, SenCAPTCHA—N/A,

image—0.46, video—0.11, text—0.59). Skipping (available after trying for one minute) was
also rare, except for audio-based CAPTCHAs (mean number of instances skipped: audio—
0.68, SenCAPTCHA—0.00, image—0.02, video—0.00, text—0.07).

6.6.5

Qualitative Feedback

Most participants provided feedback regarding their favorite and least favorite systems. In
general, 121 (72.9%) participants indicated that their favorite system was easy, 44 (26.5%)
that it was fast, and 23 (13.9%) that it was enjoyable.
SenCAPTCHA received the lion’s share of positive comments:

easy—54 (32.5%)

participants, fast—27 (16.3%) participants, enjoyable—21 (12.7%) participants, novel—10
(6.0%) participants, interesting—7 (4.2%) participants. Additionally, 5 (3.0%) participants
indicated that they liked how SenCAPTCHA did not require any typing, and 4 (2.4%)
indicated that SenCAPTCHA was mobile friendly.
For the remainder of the systems, the following were the more common answers (more
than 5 responses):
• 8 (4.8%) participants though that image-based CAPTCHAs were fast.
• 26 (15.7%) participants thought image-based CAPTCHAs were easy, 26 (15.7%) though
the same about text-based CAPTCHAs, and 9 (5.4%) though so about video-based
CAPTCHAs.
• 6 (3.6%) participants felt that image-based CAPTCHAs were understandable.
In regards to things they disliked about the CAPTCHA systems, the overwhelming
majority of feedback was from audio-based CAPTCHAs: hard to hear or understand—66
(39.8%), too hard in general—24 (14.5%), too slow—20 (12.0%), can’t be used in a public
place—16 (9.6%), too much background noise making it difficult to understand—12 (7.2%),
and annoying—11 (6.6%). For example, one person stated,
“I could not hear the letters and numbers with all the static in the background; plus
the computerized voice was awful. In short; I hated it and if I ever encountered
it in life; I would just quit that page or application.”
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The only other comment appearing more than five times was that 14 (8.4%) participants
felt that SenCAPTCHA was hard. One participant indicated that,
“It was so annoying and not easy to do if you have a squirmy baby on your lap.”
Participants largely ignored the final optional feedback field, and there is no meaningful
data to report in that regard.

6.7

Discussion

In this section, we summarize the lessons learned, discuss the viability of deploying
SenCAPTCHA in production, and identify future research directions.

6.7.1

Lessons Learned

The results from our research are rather straightforward. Users enjoyed SenCAPTCHA,
with nearly two-thirds of participants preferring SenCAPTCHA to other CAPTCHA
systems. Participants indicated that they found SenCAPTCHA to be easy and enjoyable,
demonstrating that SenCAPTCHA achieved its three design goals.

Our results also

demonstrate that users are open to sensor-based CAPTCHAs, which was unclear before
this research.
The fact that users choose SenCAPTCHA over existing schemes also indicates that users
are not satisfied with the current state of CAPTCHAs. While this might be intuitive, it is
still illustrative to be demonstrated in practice. In particular, our research shows that users
especially dislike audio-based CAPTCHAs. This is somewhat surprising as audio-based
CAPTCHAs are commonly found as a backup method for other types of CAPTCHAs. This
suggests that it might be worthwhile exploring different backup CAPTCHAs.
Need for Additional CAPTCHA Research
An interesting omission in the results for our second user study was that no users
indicated that they no longer saw a need for CAPTCHAs or that they did not need
SenCAPTCHA because they did not encounter CAPTCHAs on their mobile devices. This
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suggests that even with the emergence of NoCAPTCHA, that users are still encountering
CAPTCHAs, including on their mobile devices. Taken together with the positive reception of
SenCAPTCHA, this suggests that there remains a need for additional research into building
better CAPTCHAs. Not only are users likely still encountering CAPTCHAs, but they seem
to be very open and interested in new CAPTCHAs that are easier, faster, and more enjoyable
than current solutions. This runs counter to the current trend in the field, which has seen a
sharp decline in the amount of research on usable and secure CAPTCHA schemes.
Relationship to Prior Work
Our results regarding the relative ease of use and completion times for text-based, imagebased, and video-based CAPTCHAs are in line with prior work. For example, Reynaga et
al. [94] evaluated Picatcha [83], an image-based CAPTCHA and showed that completion of
this CAPTCHA was faster than text-based CAPTCHAs, similar to our own results.
One notable contrast between our results and past results is in relationship to work by
Brodić et al. [13]. In their research, they found that young Internet users were able to solve
CAPTCHAs more quickly than older users. Based on data from both our user studies, this
pattern does not seem to hold true for SenCAPTCHA, which was equally quick for users to
complete regardless of age.
Implementation Details for Audio-Based CAPTCHAs
While implementing our audio-based CAPTCHA using the Secureimage library, we noticed
that when we programmatically started the playback of the audio file using JavaScript (in
response to clicking a play button), that it was difficult to hear the first few fractions of a
second of the playback. While this might seem minor, it significantly decreased the success
rate for solving the audio-based CAPTCHAs. In contrast, if we used the native playback
interface to begin playback, then these first few fractions of a second were audible and success
rates were much higher (up to 50% higher). We are not sure what made this difference but
mention it here as a potential problem with the design of the Secureimage library, as the
programmatic playback approach is its default.
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6.7.2

SenCAPTCHA in Production

As with most research, the current version of SenCAPTCHA is not production-ready, but
rather a proof-of-concept implementation used to demonstrate the viability of a sensor-based
CAPTCHA. To prepare SenCAPTCHA for deployment, it would be necessary to address
the following challenges.
First, it would be necessary to have a larger corpus of images. Leveraging the mutations,
we are able to generate a large number of puzzles from a single image—for example, using
the tile mutation, each image from our corpus can be used to generate 9! = 362, 880 puzzles.
Still, the base image corpus should likely number between several hundred to a couple
thousand. This would provide a rich data source from which to generate mutated images
and would increase the difficulty of trying to reverse the mutations. Based on our experience
of generating the current image corpus, we estimate that this process would take no more
than 100 hours, something that is a very reasonable time frame for the development of
production-ready software.
Second, work needs to be done to understand why SenCAPTCHA sometimes fails to get
data from the sensor API. In our second user study, 36 (21.7%) participants were unable
to use SenCAPTCHA due to this problem. Additionally, development work is needed to
locate this bug and fix it. It might also be necessary to collaborate with browser and mobile
phone vendors to ensure that the sensor is available for SenCAPTCHA’s use. Alternatively,
SenCAPTCHA could be deployed as is, but fallback to another CAPTCHA if it is unable to
access the sensor. If SenCAPTCHA were to become popular with this type of deployment,
it would incentivize vendors to directly support sensor-based CAPTCHAs.
Third, it would be necessary to ensure that the current ball (a red ball with a black border)
is easily visible when placed over all images in the corpus. If not, it might be necessary to
calculate the color of the ball to use such that it will contrast with the underlying image.

6.7.3

Future Research Directions

In the remainder of this section, we identify future research directions for SenCAPTCHA.
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(a) Text Based

(b) Audio Based

(c) Video Based

(d) Image Based

(e) SenCAPTCHA

Figure 6.9: How current CAPTCHAs would appear on a smartwatch.

SenCAPTCHA on Smartwatches
We believe that as smartwatches continue to increase their functionality, the likelihood that
users will encounter CAPTCHAs on their smartwatches will likewise increase. For example,
(a) viewing a website that will only display its content after presenting a CAPTCHA to
prevent content scraping; (b) submitting a comment (using dictation) to a website that uses
a CAPTCHA to prevent comment spam; (c) voting in an online pool that uses CAPTCHAs
to prevent ballot stuffing. In each of these cases, the websites may have a responsive UI that
displays cleanly on a smartwatch but will still need to show a CAPTCHA to protect against
bots who would pretend to be using smartwatches if CAPTCHAs were disabled for that
form factor. While the frequency of CAPTCHAs on smartwatches will likely never match
their frequency on desktops or mobile phones (where account creation and management are
handled), it is still worthwhile to prepare for a possible (and we believe likely) future where
CAPTCHAs are occasionally encountered on smartwatches.
We believe that SenCAPTCHA would be an ideal solution for CAPTCHAs on
smartwatches. We illustrate the display of multiple CAPTCHA designs on a 46mm Moto
360 smartwatch in Figure 6.9. Observe that those CAPTCHAs relying on users’ text input
have a very bad performance, because the on-screen keyboard occupies more than half of
the screen. Some sub-figures in image-based CAPTCHAs are hidden, which makes it hard
for users to identify what the whole image looks like. On the other hand, users can still
play SenCAPTCHA as it fits on the small screens more easily, and it does not require much
screen space to display its content properly.
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Future user studies of SenCAPTCHA running on smartwatches could help confirm our
intuitions regarding SenCAPTCHA’s performance on smartwatches. It could also help
identify requirements and issues that are unique to smartwatches, helping the design of
future mobile-first CAPTCHAs.
Adversarial Machine Learning
Recent advances in adversarial machine learning have shown that it is possible to make small
perturbations in images such that humans cannot detect the change, but machine learning
classifiers are rendered unable to classify the image. Such techniques could also be applied
to SenCAPTCHA allowing it to show images without any discernable mutations, further
increasing its usability and security. This approach would not only benefit SenCAPTCHA,
but other CAPTCHAs that also rely on image recognition being hard for machine learning
(e.g., the image-based CAPTCHA from our user study).
SenCAPTCHA Using Mouse and Touch
Our implementation of SenCAPTCHA had support for moving the ball using mouse and
touch, but we did not enable this functionality in our user studies as we were primarily
interested in seeing how a sensor-based CAPTCHA would be received by users. During
development, we extensively used the mouse-based ball movement for testing and found
it to be extremely efficient and easy to use. Future research is needed to validate that
users would prefer this modality, but it seems likely considering the positive reception of
SenCAPTCHA on mobile devices.
It would also be possible to implement a version of SenCAPTCHA that allowed users
to directly tap on the eye. We chose not to do this as we wanted to avoid the “fat finger”
problem on small form factor devices, for which we think the sensor version of SenCAPTCHA
is well suited. Nevertheless, future research could evaluate whether a tap-based version of
SenCAPTCHA would work well on larger mobile devices such as tablets.
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Alternative Completion Criteria
In the current implementation of SenCAPTCHA, the puzzle is completed as soon as the
center of the ball and the target are within a set distance d. While this increases the speed
and ease of solving SenCAPTCHA, it also somewhat limits its security as an attacker will
solve the puzzle as long as the real target is on the path to the guessed target (modulo
the fact that they have to pass the DTW check). We identify three alternate completion
criteria that could be used to further increase the security of SenCAPTCHA. For each of
these criteria, future research would be needed to establish the usability impact of adopting
these approaches.
First, users could be required to hover on or near the keypoint once they have moved the
ball to it. The amount of time spent hovering would likely be very short, likely no longer
than half a second. This would ensure that the user is confident of the keypoint’s position.
With these criteria, it would likely be necessary to have the hover radius be greater than d
to accommodate users’ hands shaking during the hover period. Both the hover radius and
timing would need to be established through additional user testing.
Second, instead of having users move a ball over a single target, we could ask them
to move the ball over two different targets. After moving the ball over the second target,
SenCAPTCHA would be completed immediately (i.e., without hover) just as it is now.
The trajectory would then be examined to validate that the user had correctly changed
trajectory after moving to the first keypoint. This would also increase the challenge of
solving SenCAPTCHA by requiring an adversary not to detect just one, but two keypoints.
The order in which the user would select the keypoints could likely be left up to the user.
Care would need to be taken when selecting images to ensure that the keypoints are spaced
a reasonable distance from each other.
Third, users could confirm that the ball is near the keypoint by clicking the screen. We
choose to use a screen click as opposed to clicking a button because in our informal testing we
found that asking a user to click a button causes them to rotate their screen to position their
thumb over the button, whereas asking them to tap anywhere on the screen allows them to
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complete the CAPTCHA with no additional wrist movement. Still, usability testing would
be needed to confirm that this approach works in practice.
Using SenCAPTCHA to Create Training Data Sets
In Von Ahn et al.’s [120, 118] on ReCAPTCHA, they described how ReCAPTCHA could be
used to have users label text in images, then using those labels to help digitize books. Such
an approach is especially brilliant as it takes work that is otherwise meaningless to the enduser (CAPTCHAs help servers not users) and helps produce an outcome (book digitization)
that may be of use to the end-user. The question naturally arises then if SenCAPTCHA
could be used to label keypoints on images to similar help with research in computer vision.
Unfortunately, the current implementation of SenCAPTCHA does not lend itself to
accomplish that goal. In contrast, the two alternative completion strategies listed above
have the potential to be used to label keypoints. For the second (using two keypoints) and
third (clicking) completion criteria, we can use unlabeled images and label the point that the
user selects as the keypoint. Based on measurements from multiple users, we can calculate a
more precise position for the keypoint. Still, care must be taken that only a small number of
unlabeled images are presented to users, as the system has no way of verifying the correctness
of the presented solution.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This dissertation focuses on mobile location data analytics, privacy, and security studies.
We model the geospatial distribution of individual apps via cellular data traffic, and
analyze usages and privacy issues for shared locations on social networks.

Then, we

present homomorphic bloom filters to enhance the security of shared locations. Finally,
SenCAPTCHA is proposed for mobile devices to fight against the bots that attack remote
location servers and submit fake locations.
In the cellular location work, we propose a multi-level mixture of kernel density estimation
(mlKDE) to profile the geospatial distribution of individual mobile apps. Taking a multigranularity view on the data, we are able to find the optimal weights for each granularity level.
Within each level, we can use the latitude-longitude information of cell towers, and gather
the data volumes transmitted through that tower, to estimate the Gaussian kernel density.
Such density estimates can concisely highlight where the users are collectively located, and
serve as hierarchical components in the proposed mlKDE. Across multiple levels, the trained
weights for each level inform us about the app’s behavior with respect to other apps within
the same group. We demonstrate that the geospatial distribution profiling of apps can
be smoothed using the aggregated data from the population and group levels. Our paper
provides a general framework for modeling spatial time series data for individuals (e.g., apps,
products) that naturally have hierarchies of granularity.
In the social network location work, we give four scenarios to show the usages of shared
locations on Twitter. We first chase the 2017 Great American Eclipse on Twitter and
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demonstrate the interstate and intrastate human mobility. Then, a geographic pattern of
petitions for new emojis are visualized to show geo-tagged tweets are helpful to understand
where petitions occur. Next, we use the scooter case study to show the scooter trends in
English-speaking countries and the state-level and county-level deployment in the United
States. Finally, we propose a geo-tagged COVID-19 Twitter dataset to understand the
fine-grained public reactions.
In the homomorphic bloom filter work, we develop a distributed protocol that allows
one party to determine, in a private and secure manner, whether or not the trajectory of
a second party has an intersection with specific locations of interest. Our design is fully
flexible, meaning that each user is able to specify what kind of datasets they would like
to make visible, and be queried by other users. The methodology is based on developing
a generalized set membership check approach, using an advanced data structure called the
bloom filter. To demonstrate its feasibility and usability, we offer three working prototypes,
which are implemented on the open-source homomorphic libraries. Our preliminary results
illustrate the performance and overhead of the proposed approaches as well as the security
of the protocol designs.
In the SenCAPTCHA work, we design and implement a mobile-first CAPTCHA using
orientation sensors. SenCAPTCHA works by showing users an image of an animal and
asking them to tilt their device to guide a red ball into the center of that animal’s eye.
SenCAPTCHA is especially useful for devices with small screen sizes (e.g., smartphones,
smartwatches).

We describe the design of SenCAPTCHA and demonstrate that it is

resilient to various machine learning based attacks. We also report two usability studies of
SenCAPTCHA involving a total of 472 participants; our results show that SenCAPTCHA is
viewed as an “enjoyable” CAPTCHA and that it is preferred by over half of the participants
to other existing CAPTCHA systems.
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